Bilaga till rapport

Effekter av arbetsmarknadsinsatser för personer med varaktigt försörjningsstöd/
Effects of active labor market programs-
among long-term social assistance recipients,
rapport 351, (2022)

Bilaga 3 Tabell över kvantitativa studier / Appendix 3 Characteristics of quantitative studies

Study (ref) Year Country Study type	Population *(who, where, when)* Target and Comparison groups Age and Sex Follow-up	Study aim Intervention *(Swedish term)*	Outcome/s Results	Risk of bias Adverse events Comments
Almeida [1] **2010** **Argentina** **Register study**[1]	**Participants** N = 476 (465 households, 2 104 individuals[2]) <u>Sample</u> drawn from a registry of Jefes recipients showing interest in MEP between January 2004 and the 4th quarter of 2005, regardless of whether they applied for a grant or not. The analysis considers only those living in the Greater Buenos Aires area. <u>Target groups</u>: MEP grant beneficiaries (P) Ever P: N = 178 Dropout P: N = 3 (2004 only) Entrant P: N = 155 (2005 only) Always P: N = 20 (2004 and 2005)	**Study aim** *To study the effect of a program that promotes self-employment among workfare beneficiaries in Argentina.* **Self-employment program, Microemprendimientos Productivos (MEP)** **Content/description** <u>Background:</u> Jefes was an emergency workfare program aimed at reducing poverty and unemployment after a	**Employment** <u>Labor Market employment</u> (not MEP) DID[3] fraction yes (SE, observations, R^2) Entrant P vs Applicant NP : -0.144 (0.077, 602, 0.6) * <u>Total hours worked, individual</u> (MEP or other LM) DID[3] hours (SE, observations, R^2) Entrant P vs Applicant NP : 17.93 (3.444, 558, 0.75) *** **Income**[4] <u>Income, individual</u>: DID[3] ARS (SE, observations, R^2) Entrant P vs Applicant NP: 30.306 (20.859, 599, 0.73) * Significance at the 10% level ** Significance at the 5% level *** Significance at the 1% level	**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1- Data is from a household survey administered to people showing interest in MEP that was conducted by the Brazilian agency SIEM-PRO, November

	Comparison groups: Those who never received an MEP grant (NP) All NP: N = 298 Applicant NP= 146 Non-applicant = 152 **Sex:** % Female (SD) All (P & NP): 70 (46) Entrant P: 67 (47) Always P: 50 (51) Total NP: 73 (44) **Age**: years (SD) All (P & NP): 39.4 (10.5) Entrant P: 38.2 (11.0) Always P: 43.5 (12.2) Total NP: 39.8 (10.0) **Follow-up:** 12 months **Loss to follow-up**[3]**:** 14% of baseline respondents were lost to follow-up (because of project failure, or because the participants had left the project or could not be located).	severe economic crisis in 2001. Jefes imposed no time limit, had work-requirement of 20 hrs per week that was ineffective ineffectively, and because the program was being phased out, there was a fear that once a family left Jefes, it would not be able to reapply. MEP is a Brazilian program to stimulate movement from welfare to self-employment. Participants were provided with start-up capital through in-kind grants. The grants were up to 30x larger than normal Jefes benefits, but the participants were not given the money directly. Once their project proposal was approved the government acquired the requested equipment and start-up materials for them. The program also provided support from "tutors" who would teach participants manage their new company so it would become a sustainable source of income (5 visits over 6 months, of which at least 1 was specifically for technical support).		2004 and at the end of 2005. The data had basic individual and household characteristics including family characteristics, education levels, labour market history, and income sources, as well as whether an application was made, if it was accepted, and the characteristics of any proposed projects. 2- MEP required that beneficiaries paired up in groups of 3 to submit

		Maximum program duration was 6 months. MEP was run twice. MEP was purely voluntary, and all Jefes recipients were eligible to apply. Note that the authors describe significant issues with implementation. Per comparison group: main aspects of the program including extent, duration, penalties, compulsion, eligibility, consequences of non-compliance		a project proposal. 3- Analysis difference-in-difference (DID) using least square estimates to evaluate the impact of the project. SE are clustered at the project level for beneficiaries and at the municipal level for the others. 4- Income probably reported in Argentinean pesos (ARS) **Abbreviations** MEP = Microemprendimientos Productivos, a Brazilian program to stimulate movement from welfare to self-employment

					NP = non-participants P = participants LM = labour market DID = differences in differences (difference in the mean differences before and after)
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population (who, where, when)** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention (Swedish term)**	**Outcome/s** **Results**		**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Arendt [2] 2019 Denmark ***Register study[1]***	**Participants** Total: N = 11 109 individuals **Observations:** Target group: TW: N = 7 920 Comparison group: CW: N = 3 570 **Target group:** long-term unemployed people living in Denmark who had received social assistance for 329 to 349 (wide window, TW), or 329 to 334 (narrow window, TN) days[2] in	**Study aim** *To estimate effects of an employment bonus program for long-term unemployed social assistance recipients.* **Employment-contingent bonus program,** entitlement increasing the effective wages which could be earned on top of social assistance *(+ Swedish term)* **Content/description** The program automatically and immediately pays benefit bonuses of up to 6 % of post-tax earnings to anyone qualified, for any	**Employment outcomes:** <u>Regular employment</u> (weeks, cumulative) Mean (SE) CW: 13.84 TW: 13.26 SD[4] W: -2.22 RD[5] W: 0.82 (1.97)[6] t-test indicates no significant differences between means <u>Earnings</u> (DKK, cumulative) Mean (SE) CW: 41 890 TW: 39 400 SD[4] W: -2 270 RD[5] W: 4 627 (9 997) t-test indicates no significant differences between means		**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1- Data source: administrative registry data from Statistics Denmark covering all individuals residing in Denmark 2- The official program eligibility cut-off was 329 days receiving social services. The authors primarily analysed people within 21 days of qualifying to each side this limit (308 to 349 days). A second analysis on people within 6 days to each side of the limit was also done (323 to 334 days). 3- In Denmark, Social assistance was means-tested, amounted to approximately 50% of

	the year before the program was rolled out on February 29, 2012 **Comparison group:** long-term unemployed people living in Denmark who had received social assistance for at least 308 to 328 (wide window, CW) or 323 to 328 (narrow window, CN) days[2] in the year before the program was rolled out on February 29, 2012 **Age** (years) Target group: TW: 35.8 TN: 35.8 Comparison group: CW: 34.4 CN: 34.8 t-test for differences between groups: p < 0.01 for both narrow and wide window **Sex** (% women) Target group: TW: 47% TN: 48% Comparison group: CW: 42% CN: 45% t-test for differences between groups: p < 0.01 for wide window,	hours worked. Benefits are paid regardless of if the work is in regular employment or from subsidized employment schemes, provided they enter employment within the 2 years the program ran.	**Secondary outcomes** Regular or subsidized employment (weeks, cumulative) Mean (SE) RD[5] W: -1.26 (2.93) ALMP participation (weeks, cumulative) Mean (SE) RD[5] W: 0.56 (2.53)	wages for a full-time job at the average wage. only 2 USD per hour worked could be. 4- Standard difference (SD) = difference in means T vs C divided by pooled SD. This calculation does not take into account that there are multiple significant between group differences. 5- Relative cumulative differences (TW vs CW) calculated with linear regression discontinuity method, non-parametric. Extracted only results with corrections for covariates and bias here. Covariates are age, female, immigrant status, education, weeks in regular employment 2009–2010, characteristics of children, married, health care use, criminal record. Results also available without these corrections. 6- Subgroup results (table 3) for with / without children, ≤30 / >30, male / female, immigrant status; (table 6) per administrative region **Abbreviations** TW = target group from wide window sample CW = comparison group from wide window sample SE = standard error ALMP = active labour market program WTW = welfare-to-work

	not significant for narrow window **Follow-up:** 2 years during the entitlement period **Loss to follow-up:** Sample attrition 2% (death or emigration)			**Comments from RAS** Bias? Most outcomes not reported for narrow window. Results reported only from selected analyses for several outcomes.?? Worth checking to see if it is possible that the choices were guided by the message the authors wanted to deliver?
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Autor **[3]** **2005** **USA** **Register study**[1]	**Participants** N = 23 746 Observations = 36 105 entries into WF programs <u>Sample</u>: People living in 9 districts of an unnamed city in Michigan who participated in WF programs between 1999 and 2003. **Comparison groups** TE: people placed in temporary employment through a temp agency, n= 3 286 DE: people who were employed directly n=13 709 NE: people who were not employed within 3 months of entering WF **Age:** not reported **Sex:** not reported	**Study aim** *To identify whether a temporary agency placement, relative to no job placement or a direct-hire job placement, improves or harms labour market outcomes for those whose job placement status is impacted by contractor assignment* (using a quasi-experimental research design) **Temporary jobs via temp agencies**, WTW	**Employment** Comparison between Temp and Direct-Hire Jobs Weekly Hours (m (sd)) Temp = 37.01 (0.10) Direct hire = 33.54 (0.06) **Income** Weekly Earnings (dollar, m (sd)) Temp = 284.38 (1.43) Direct hire = 245.78 (0.80) Welfare case closed due to earnings, %, coefficient estimate (standard error) Temp =32.9, 11.5 (11.1) Direct hire = 37.6, 24.6** (7.1) R^2 = 0.20, H_0 = 0.41 **indicate significance at the 0.05 level	**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1- Data based on 30-minute telephone surveys of 21 WF contractors (service-providers, 21 of 25) conducted between fall 2004 and spring 2005 (4 contractors were no longer

	Follow-up: 8 quarters **Loss to follow-up:** Information on the reason for case closure was missing for 1,595 exits from WF programs, so these observations were dropped from the analysis	**Content/description** <u>Background</u>: In Michigan, recipients of TANF must work 40 hours / week or participate in ALMP (WF programs) aimed at moving them into employment as quickly as possible. Michigan's Family Independence Agency (FIA) determines eligibility and administers benefit payments, while administration of WTW activities is contracted out to NPO or public sector entities (contractors). Contractors usually provide JSA and 40 hours of basic JSS training, covering, for example, interview skills, how to fill in an application or write a resume, or skills assessment. Access to intensive training is limited, but available through other non-WF programs. After placement in a job, contractors must conduct monthly follow-ups of both clients and their employers for a minimum of 90 days, or until the case can be closed due to sufficiently high		operating in the area when contact was attempted) combined with administrative data from FIA covering basic demographics, welfare use, and wages for everyone who entered a WF-program between the 4th quarter of 1999 and the 2nd quarter of 2003. 2- The studies quasi-experimental, takes advantage of variation in how likely different contractors placed clients in TE, DE, or no

		earnings or non-compliance.		employment. Referenced analysis shows this is functionally equivalent o random assignment. 3- 2SLS and OLS models are used to calculate probabilities. And are controlled for age, race, prior earnings, and education level. The authors state that the OLS "are purely descriptive" 4- Wages and earnings data were inflated to 2003 dollars using the Consumer Price Index. **Abbreviations** WTW = welfare to work

				TE = temporary employment through a temping agency DE = direct employment NE = no employment WF = work first TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families ALMP = active labour market programs NPO = non-profit organization JSA = job search assistance JSS = job search skills AA = aptitude assessment FIA = Family Independence
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population (who, where, when)** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention (Swedish term)**	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Ayala **[4]** **2013** **Spain**	**Participants** 2 300 households were surveyed year 2001, data covers 50 000 IMI spells. Analysis of a random sample of ex-welfare recipients	**Study aim** *To measure the relative effectiveness of the different activities*	**P vs NP and pairwise comparisons** **Current employment** Estimated means (sd), Employment effects (PS matching estimates).	**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1- Data source:

<table>
<tr>
<td>Register study[1]</td>
<td>divided into four strata based on entry date, exit date, duration of IMI participation, town size.

Comparison groups:
N= number of observations
Life skills: N = 811
General ALMP: N = 594
Intensive ALMP: N = 113
Mixed ALMP: N = 331

Sex (%)
<table>
<tr><td></td><td>C</td><td>JSA</td><td>WF</td><td>M</td></tr>
<tr><td>Male</td><td>34.9</td><td>29.9</td><td>34.5</td><td>35.8</td></tr>
<tr><td>Female</td><td>65.1</td><td>70.1</td><td>65.5</td><td>64.2</td></tr>
</table>
Age groups (%)
<table>
<tr><td></td><td>C</td><td>G</td><td>WF</td><td>M</td></tr>
<tr><td><26</td><td>5.6</td><td>11.5</td><td>3.4</td><td>7.9</td></tr>
<tr><td>26–35</td><td>23.8</td><td>28.9</td><td>27.6</td><td>31.0</td></tr>
<tr><td>36–45</td><td>24.2</td><td>30.4</td><td>34.5</td><td>36.2</td></tr>
<tr><td>46–55</td><td>21.9</td><td>18.5</td><td>25.3</td><td>18.3</td></tr>
<tr><td>56–65</td><td>24.5</td><td>10.7</td><td>9.2</td><td>6.6</td></tr>
</table>
Follow-up:
Not reported</td>
<td>available for IMI recipients:
1- we tested whether work-related sub-programmes performed better than general activities aimed at improving life skills
2- We tried to identify which work-related sub-programme worked best

Madrid regional government's welfare programme (IMI), ALMP
14 interventions grouped into 4 categories:
Life skills training (C)
General job search support and training (JSA)
Work-first ALMP (WF)
Mixed ALMP (M)

Content/description
<u>Background</u>
Social assistance through IMI is provided to unemployed people who do not have unemployment insurance, or who's unemployment insurance has expired. Benefits may be entitlements, but seem to be conditional upon employment activation activities, including</td>
<td>C= 0.262 (0.440)
Any work-related scheme = 0.292 (0.455)
C vs any work-related scheme Average effect = 11.5*

C = 0.244 (0.430)
JSA = 0.256 (0.437)
C vs JSA Average effect = 4.9

C = 0.269 (0.444)
WF = 0.402 (0.493)
C vs WF Average effect 49.4**

C = 0.244 (0.430)
M = 0.296 (0.457)
C vs M Average effect 21.3*

JSA = 0.240 (0.427)
WF = 0.385 (0.489)
JSA vs WF Average effect 60.4**

JSA = 0.265 (0.442)
M = 0.313 (0.464)
JSA vs M Average effect 18.1

WF = 0.376 (0.487)
M = 0.296 (0.457)
WF vs M Average effect -21.3

Standard deviation in brackets.
***Significant at 99 per cent, **Significant at 95 per cent, *Significant at 90 per cent. PS: propensity score.</td>
<td>administrative data linked IMI to a survey of 2300 households receiving IMI conducted by the Madrid Government in 2001.
2- Baseline differences managed using propensity score matching using a structural approach for differences between participation and non-participation groups and reduced-form approach for the pairwise comparisons. The covariates were the</td>
</tr>
</table>

		participation in ALMP or life-skills activities. IMI recipients and caseworkers work together to establish an "insertion" plan which outlines the activities and public programs that will be applied. They are based on individual assessment and meant to improve the recipient's self-sufficiency. All recipients must participate in at least one program; simultaneous participation in multiple programs is common. <u>Comparison group</u> Life skills only participants (C) No participation in any ALMP. Life skills training is meant to guarantee that social participation is possible. Activities include general information, general counselling, continuous individual support, psychological support, legal support, children intervention, family mediation, assistance related to other social benefits and group activities <u>Treatment groups</u>		number of social problems, single parenthood, educational level, unemployment rate at entry, household size, number of children, single persons and gender – all of which were measured at the moment of entering the programme. **Abbreviations** WTW = welfare to work ALMP = active labour market programs Does ALMP = WTW? WF = work first LFA = labour force attachment Does WF = LFA Δ = change

		ALMP / WTW activities JSA: general job search assistance, including access to employment offers application training Work-first (WF): intensive activities aimed at getting recipients into the labour market as soon as possible (subsidised employment and JC) Mixed (M): simultaneous participation in general and intensive ALMP, not in any of the other groups Duration, intensity, and consequences of non-compliance not reported for any of the interventions			SD = Standard deviation C = control or comparison M = mixed or multiple program JSA = job search assistance IMI = Ingreso Madrileño de Integración (Madrid Regional Government's Welfare Programme) JC = job creation strategies, usually in the public sector, possibly via non-profit organizations
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**		**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Bernhard [5] **2014**	**Participants**	**Study aim** *To investigate whether job search assistance (JSA) helps*	**Employment** Employed, regular unsubsidized: months since start of JSA		**Risk of bias**: Low

Germany **Register study**[1]	Eligible: Long-term unemployed, aged 15 to 57, collecting UBII in Germany in 2005 Target group: Eligible who entered a JSA between February and April 2005 Comparison group: randomly drawn 20% of all eligible UBII recipients on 31 January 2005 who did not enter a JSA between February and April 2005 **Comparison groups:** N=number of participants CAT vs. NP 3 865 vs. 323 346 IC vs. NP 1 159 vs. 323 343 IC vs. CAT 1 109 vs. 3 540 CAT vs IC 3539 vs. 1109 **Sex:** % women IC: 41.7% CAT: 45.5% NP: 42.5% **Age**: % per group years IC CAT NP 15–24 29.1 25.1 9.7 25–29 11.6 12.3 11.0 30–39 24.0 28.5 27.6 40–49 23.4 25.2 31.5 50–57 12.0 8.9 20.3 **Immigrant background:** % yes IC: 41.7% CAT: 45.5% NP: 42.5%	*disadvantaged individuals to find jobs and whether courses or individual counselling is more successful.* **Job search assistance (JSA)** in general Classroom application training (CAT) Individual counselling (IC) **Content/description** Background (NP) UBII, are the basic benefits paid to needy, unemployed people of working age and deemed able to work, and who are not / no longer eligible for UBI. UBII benefits are means-tested against household income and assets. Base benefit of €391, as of January 2014. Costs for housing and heating are also covered. UBII receipt is conditional upon employment activation activities, failure to comply may result in financial sanctions. Assignment to any ALMP, including JSA is largely at the discretion of case managers who are guided by the participants job placement probability, motivation, and family responsibilities. CAT	JSA-CAT vs. JSA-NP No data provided *JSA-CAT "decreased individual employment prospects of participants by one to four percentage points"* JSA-IC vs. JSA-NP No data provided *"Individual JSA does not affect the employment prospects at all"*	1- Data source: Integrated Employment Biographies, which is rich dataset administered by the German Federal Employment Agency 2- Individual employment effects are estimated from a quasi-experimental set-up. Corrections for differences between groups were applied based on propensity scores using a radius calliper matching method. **Comments:** **Abbreviations** NP = non-participants JSA = job search assistance CAT = classroom application training IC = individual counselling ALMP = active labour market program UBI = time limited unemployment insurance benefits UBII = means tested unemployment benefits CT= classroom training

	Follow-up: 28 months	Includes lectures focused on general knowledge about applying for work, lecture notes, and, optionally, one individual counselling interview or one application situation simulation. Up to 16 participants per course Duration 2 days to 2 weeks, full or part-time Perfect attendance is required, failure may result in sanctions <u>IC</u> Individually tailored job application support. Together with a counsellor, the participant analyses previous job search activities to identify ways to improve application strategies. Duration 4 weeks Perfect attendance not compulsory, although scheduled meetings must not be missed. Participants may use facilities to write applications and search for jobs <u>Both CAT and IC:</u> Participants continue to receive UBII with no additional cash benefit Interventions are provided by external providers selected through a public tendering strategy that judges strategy and price		

Study (ref) Year Country Study type	Population *(who, where, when)* Target and Comparison groups Age and Sex Follow-up	Study aim Intervention *(Swedish term)*	Outcome/s Results	Risk of bias Adverse events Comments
Bloom **[6]** **2002** **USA** **RCT**[1]	**Participants** N = 4 803 <u>Sample</u> Applicants[2] for cash assistance in Manchester and New Haven between January 1996 and February 1997. <u>Comparison groups</u> JF : N = 2 396 AFDC : N = 2 407 **Sex**: % women *98.3% (N = 2 384)* <u>Mean age (years)</u> Manchester: 29.9 New Haven: 30.9 Full sample: 30.7 <u>Follow-up:</u> 4 years <u>Loss to follow-up:</u> 6 115 people were randomly assigned Analysis excludes: 2-parent households (N = 387) Child-only households (N = 677) Errors in random assignment (N = 240) Missing Social Security number (N = 8) AND Baseline measurements are missing for 161 people	**Study aim** To assess the effects of Connecticut's Jobs First (JF) program on a range of economic and non-economic outcomes compared to AFDC. **Jobs First vs. AFDC** **Content/description** <u>JF</u> is a time limited WTW program: 21 cumulative month limit per family on cash assistance. Limited extensions and exemptions possible if the family is below the poverty level and the recipients have made a good faith effort to find work. Families where the parent is unable to work are exempt from the time limit. Benefit receipt is conditional on participation in employment services that aimed at rapid job placement. Families with a child under the age of 1	**Employment** Mean quarterly employment rate, over 4-year follow-up (%)[3] JF 56.3 (N = 2 381) AFDC 49.1 (N = 2 392) Δ 7.2*** Δ% 14.7 **Income**, over 4-year follow-up: mean (USD)[3] 1- Total average income from work 2- Total average benefits from AFDC or JF 3- Total average Food Stamp benefits received 4- Total average income from all sources <u>JF</u> <u>AFDC</u> <u>DIFF</u> <u>Δ%</u> 1 26 673 24 861 1 813** 7.3 2 11 064 10 827 237 2.2 3 6 133 5 819 314** 5.4 4 43 870 41 506 2 364*** 5.7 N= 2 381 2 392 * Significance at the 10% level ** Significance at the 5% level *** Significance at the 1% level **Program costs and benefits** The gross program cost of Jobs First over a five-year follow-up period was USD 8 040 per Jobs First group member. The net cost of Jobs First, over and above what was spent on the AFDC program, was about USD 2 250 per person. The benefit-cost findings show that Jobs First benefited participants. Over five years, program group members	**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1- Data based on State administrative records, client surveys with varying focus at baseline, 18 months (N = 800) and 3 years (N = 2 424) post randomization, a teacher survey. Randomization at time of application, whether new or for renewal. 2- Half of applicants were randomised

		(and not conceived while the mother was on welfare), are exempt from the job search requirement. Sanctions for non-compliance with job search requirements: 20% for 3 months, 35% for 3 months, cancelled for 3 months. All earned income up to the poverty level (1 138 USD / month in 1998) is disregarded. Includes childcare assistance if income 75% under median income, and medical assistance (Medicaid) for up to 2 years. AFDC is not time limited. Benefit receipt is conditional on participation in employment services. Families with a child under the age of 2 are exempt from the job search requirement. Sanctions for non-compliance with job search requirements: cancellation until compliance, cancellation at least 3 months, cancellation at least 6 months. 20% of gross earnings are disregarded. Includes 1	experienced gains in income and services. These participant gains exceeded the government's investment in the program. All costs expressed in year 1999 USD.	to control the workload. The other half were enrolled in JF but not included in the study. Randomization occurred prior to approval or exemptions being granted; 29.8% of those assigned to JS were exempt at sometime within 48 months of random assignment. People who had been part of a study of CT's prior welfare system were also excluded from this study.

		year of transitional childcare, and 1 year of Medicaid.		3- Also available for pre- and post-time limit periods (Table 3), at 4-year follow-up (Table 4), and for subgroups: least disadvantaged, moderately disadvantaged, most disadvantaged (Table 5). **Comments:** Employed at random assignment (%) Manchester: 28.3 New Haven: 21.1 Full sample: 22.8 **Abbreviations** CT = Connecticut AFDC = Aid to Families with Dependent Children

				JF = Jobs First program (TFA) EID = Earned income disregard USD = US dollar WTW = welfare to work Δ = change
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Brenninkmeijer [7] **2011** **Netherlands** **RCT**[1]	**Participants** Total: N = 118 Recruitment[2]: Residents of the city of Lelystad between 18 and 57.5 years old, who were receiving benefits payments, and who did not have serious psychosocial or behavioural problems that might hinder the intervention (e.g., drug addiction, serious psychiatric disorders, aggressive delinquent behaviour) were invited to participate in the study. **Comparison groups:** JOBS: N = 47 Voucher: N = 33 Control: N = 38 **Mean Age** (years) 38 (range 19 to 54) **Sex**: 70 % women **Follow-ups:**	**Study aim** *To compare the effectiveness of the JOBS program with an employment voucher intervention and a control condition.* **JOBS program**, a group training program for the unemployed **Content/description** JOBS is a short, intensive manual-based group training program. Group size may vary from 12 to 20 participants. Participants attended 5 half-day classes over 1 week. The program is guided by two facilitators who follow a strict	**Employment** Any employment Full-time, part-time, or subsidized employment: number yes (%) At 6 months[3] JOBS: N = 12 (26%) Voucher: N = 3 (9%) Control: N = 4 (11%) At 12 months[4] JOBS: N = 13 (28%) Voucher: - Control: N = 5 (15%)	**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1- Employment records were used for employment outcomes, all secondary outcomes were self-reported on questionnaires. Participants received €5 per returned questionnaire, plus a

	1, 6, and 12 months **Loss to follow-up:** 35 of the 160 who agreed to participate were lost to follow-up: JOBS: N = 13 Voucher: N = 12 Control: N = 10	protocol with a fixed order of exercises. Exercises include topics such as networking, 'thinking as an employer', writing an application letter and a curriculum vitae and participating in a practice job interview. The program aims to strengthen self-confidence, self-efficacy, and problem-solving skills. JOBS is based on active learning, setback inoculation, provision of social support, and respect. The program was altered by adding 1-2 individual consultations per month for up to 5 months after the course to offer support in overcoming barriers and strengthen skills and knowledge provided in the JOBS training <u>Voucher intervention</u> provided individuals with a personal budget of €700 that could be spent on training and services to help them improve their chances of entering the labour market For example, the person could use the voucher to help them acquire a driving license. They were		bonus of €5 for returning all 4. 2- Participation in the intervention was mandatory, however individuals could decline participation in the study. People over 57.5 are exempt from the job search obligation. 3- ITT used for short term follow-ups. 4- For ethical reasons, individuals were allowed to switch groups after 6 months. 18 in the voucher group and 3 in the control group chose to switch to

		individually supported by social service employees every other week. Control: individuals had 2 appointments with a social services employee, who checked entitlement, time between appointments was 6 months.		the JOBS group after 6 months. These individuals are excluded from the analysis at 12 months. **Comments:** **Abbreviations** NP = non-participants P = participants IC = individual counselling ITT = intention to treat **Comments from RAS** Interesting: The JOBS program was developed in 1984 at the Michigan Prevention Research Centre (Caplan et al., 1989) and supports unemployed individuals in finding a job. The program

				was initially designed to target depressive symptomatology among the unemployed.
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Breunig [8] **2003** **Australia** **RCT**[1]	**Participants** Invited to participate Total: N = 4740 C: N = 1800 IMC: N = 2940 IMC-51T: N = 1082 IMC-3I: N = 409 Sample All clients from 20 randomly chosen unemployment offices (Centerlink) who had been receiving income support via Newstart Allowance for ≥ 5 years **Sex:** % female C : 28 IMC : 25 IMC-51T : 31 **Mean age** (years) C: 36.0 IMC: 36.7 IMC-51T: 35.7	**Study aim** *To assess whether an intensive interview with follow-ups would result in increased participation in economic and social life for long-term recipients of income support.* **Increased monitoring and counselling (IMC),** ALMP **Content/description** Background: The Australian income-support system is need-base and paid uniformly irrespective of previous work history. Some obligations to work (paid or voluntary), search for work, or participate in education exist, most intensely in the first 12 months of a spell of unemployment.	**Employment** Time worked[4] Mean hours/week, Proportion participating (PP) hrs/week PP N = IMC-51T 3.64 0.299 234 Matched C 5.88 0.349 402 MD -2.24*** -0.050 SE 0.75 0.038 **Education**[4] Mean hours/week, Proportion participating (PP) hrs/week PP N = IMC-51T 2.72 0.176 239 Matched C 1.57 0.123 429 MD 1.15** 0.053* SE 0.55 0.030 **Earnings** Proportion with income from work (PIW), from June 1 to 28, 2001 N = PIW Estimate (SE) ITT[5] IMC-51T 988 0.212 -0.024 (0.017) C 1 643 0.236	**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1- Survey data matched to administrative data covering employment and benefit receipt from a national database. Significant baseline differences between groups for multiple characteristics indicated that randomizati

	Follow-up: Approximately 6 months **Loss to follow-up:** Number of participants[2] (% of total invited) <u>IMC</u> Interview 1: N = 1520 (51.7 %) Interview 2: N = 1221 (41.5 %) Interview 3: N = 409 (13.9 %) <u>IMC-51T</u>: N = 1082 Interview 1: N = 578 (53.4 %) Interview 2: N = 473 (43.7 %) Interview 3: N = 239 (41.3 %) <u>Control</u> Interview 1: N = 728 (40.4 %) Interview 2: N = 560 (31.1 %) Interview 3: N = 429 (23.8 %)	Consequently, the long-term unemployed have only limited contact with officials. <u>IMC</u> consisted of a letter, 2 face-to-face interviews / counselling sessions with trained caseworkers[2]. Interview 1 (September to October 2000) gathered baseline information and explored aspirations and barriers to social participation and guided the development of a Participation Plan. Interview 2 monitored progress (November to December 2000). <u>Control</u> group members received a letter in October 2000 asking if they could be interviewed. Those who agreed were interviewed by an independent marketing firm[2] in the same time periods as for the face-to-face interviews.	ATT[6] IMC-3I 239 0.268 0.032 (0.03) C 1 800 0.236 <u>Mean income of earners</u> (AUD), from June 1 to 28, 2001 N = AUD Estimate (SE) ITT[5] IMC-51T 988 255.55 0.84 (24.14) C 1 643 254.71 ATT[6] IMC-3I 209 262.84 8.12 (36.85) C 388 254.72 * Significance at the 10% level ** Significance at the 5% level *** Significance at the 1% level	on was not fully successful. The authors discovered that the subgroup of participants < 51 years old who had a registered telephone number (IMC-51T) were not significantly different from the control group. 2- This is only full participation, where only those who participated in the previous interviews were included at each wave. 3- A third telephone interview

				was conducted, in March and April 2021, by an independent market research company was used to assess the intervention but is not considered part of the intervention itself. 4- Mean calculated using survey data for IMC-51T compared to controls selected using kernel propensity score matching to estimate which people in the control group would have fully participate

				d had they been selected. People with no matches or with incomplete data were omitted. 5- Calculations based on administrative data. ITT estimates based on IMC-51T, and everyone assigned to control. 6- Calculations based on administrative data. ATT estimates are based on those in the IMC group who participated in all 3 interviews (IMC-3I) and everyone randomized to the control

				group. ATT was also calculated based on control groups who participated in interview 3 (see publication for details). **Abbreviations** IMC = increased monitoring and counselling ATT = average treatment effect on the treated (mean treatment effect among those who received the intervention) ITT = intention to treat AUD = Australian dollar SE = standard error
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**

Cammeraat [9] 2017 Netherlands **Register study**	**Participants** Observations 1999-2012, where 1999-2009 is the pre reform period, and 2010-2012 the treatment period. **Sample** Young welfare recipients. Intervention: 376,083 Control: 391,627 **Age** Intervention: 25- 26 years Control: 27-28 years. **Sex** No information on numbers of men and women	**Study aim** *the effects of a mandatory activation program for young individuals during a severe economic recession. Specifically, we study the WIJ (Wet Investeren in Jongeren, Work Investment Act for Young Individuals) reform, introduced in the Netherlands at the end of 2009, just after the start of the Great Recession.* **Background** The WIJ reform aimed at activating the young, as well as fostering their human capital formation. The WIJ stipulated that for individuals below the age of 27, entitlement to welfare benefits was conditional on participation in a mandatory activation program. **Intervention** Work-learn offers and consisted of public employment programs, apprenticeships and internships. Any wage earnings in these programs were supplemented up to	Differences-in-differences: base regression results (SE) **Employment rate:** -0,0023 (0.0066) **Enrollment rate in education:** 0.0009 (0.0051)	**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1. The data was drawn from a large administrative data set, the Labour Market Panel Arbeidsmarktpanel) of Statistics Netherlands. 2. Differences-in-differences and regression discontinuity are used. All specifications include age and year fixed effects.

		the level of welfare benefits. **Control** Persons aged 27-28 years		
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Dengler [10] **2019** **Germany** **Register study**[1]	**Population** Welfare recipients Total: N = 1 013 487 (50.1% women) WGM: N = 348 958 WGW: N = 362 237 (50.9%) EGM = 157 278 EGW = 145 014 (48.0%) OEJ total: I= 41 741; C=725 381 CT total: I= 30 570; C=750 041 OJT total: I= 21 064; C=741 848 VT total: I= 8 663; C=726 361 **Comparison groups** Number of observations for WGM and WGW for intervention (I) /matched control groups (C) **OEJ** WGM: I= 17 387 / C=233 083	**Study aim** *Analyse the effects of participating in four major active labour market programmes (ALMPs) on various dimensions of job quality.* **Interventions:** **One-Euro-Jobs (OEJ)**, a public employment program **Classroom training (CT)** **On-the-job training (OJT)** **Extended vocational training (VT)** **<u>Content/description</u>** **Interventions** **OEJ** is an ALMP that subsidises work opportunities in the public	**Employment**[3] <u>Participants with stable employment by *at least* 12 months</u>[4, 5] I% = % in matched intervention group; C% = % in matched control groups (C%); ATT[6] (difference of the means) **WGM** / **WGW** **<u>I%</u>** **<u>C%</u>** **<u>ATT</u>** **<u>I%</u>** **<u>C%</u>** **<u>ATT</u>** **OEJ** 23.1 23.5 -0.2[ns] 24.6 20.6 3.7* **CT** 28.8 26.5 2.3* 26.0 21.5 4.0* **OJT** 45.6 30.6 14.2* 47.2 27.9 18.9* **VT** 40.4 29.1 11.2* 37.0 24.0 12.8* **EGM** / **EGW** **<u>I%</u>** **<u>C%</u>** **<u>ATT</u>** **<u>I%</u>** **<u>C%</u>** **<u>ATT</u>** **OEJ** 21.8 22.3 -0.1[ns] 22.8 21.8 1.5** **CT** 28.4 24.4 3.8*** 28.3 25.8 2.3**	**Risk of bias**: Low 1- The data was drawn from the German Federal Employment Agency administrative database 2- Data also provided for total population and participants in East Germany. 3- Five additional employment incomes are also reported: regular employment;

WGW: I= 9 415 / C=277 023

CT
WGM: I= 14 200 / C=242 150
WGW: I= 9 913 / C=285 075

EGW: I= 2778 /C=109 727
EGM: I=3679 /C=113 089

OJT
WGM: I= 9 145/ C=239 242
WGW: I= 3 913 / C=282 136

EGM: I= 5001/C=111 762
EGW: I= 3005 /C=108 708

VT
WGM: I= 3 833 / C=233 590
WGW: I= 2 247 / C=277 317

EGM: I= 1675/ C= 109 224
EGW: I= 908 / C= 106 230

Eligibility
UBII recipients in Germany without contributory income who were newly registered. 70% were registered in West Germany.

Program starts when a person begins an ALMP.

No program (UBII) is set as a default 122 days after the person enters the register if receive benefits continuously (gaps of < 31 days) but are not assigned ALMP.

sector, and which would not otherwise exist. Job placements are expressly temporary (6 month maximum) and usually limited to 30 hours per week, so the participant also has time to search for regular employment.

Participants receive regular UBII benefits plus 1-2 euros per hour

The OEJ program is directed toward UBII recipients who are especially hard-to-place in employment (i.e., young adults, older adults, people without education or with immigrant backgrounds, and women facing specific placement barriers). To be eligible for an OEJ a person must be a permanent UBII recipient and have had no income from work.

Case workers determine which program ALMP, if any, will be offered based on a legal framework and local conditions. Failure or refusal to participate can result in loss of benefits.

OJT	44.0	27.6	15.5***	49.1	29.7	19.2***
VT	42.3	26.6	15.3***	41.2	27.7	13.2***

Income

Gross monthly income
Mean for intervention (I€) /matched control groups (C€)/ ATT[6] (difference of the means)

	WGM			WGW		
	I€	**C€**	**ATT**	**I€**	**C€**	**ATT**
OEJ	326.6	369.4	-31.3*	260.8	230.5	27*
CT	464.8	431.3	30.8*	326.3	253.8	63.8*
OJT	976.0	549.7	405.4*	699.5	359.8	327*
VT	796.3	494.8	298.3*	500.8	303.3	192.8*

	EGM			EGW		
	I€	**C€**	**ATT**	**I€**	**C€**	**ATT**
OEJ	231.6	293.4	-51.1*	219.7	216.7	6.9*
CT	389.1	353.9	54.2*	323.4	260.8	60.5*
OJT	805.5	433.3	355.0*	672.0	326.5	335.5*
VT	717.4	415.7	296.5*	510.9	325.5	179.8*

*Significance level 1%
ns not significant (>10% significance level)

part-time regular employment; minor employment; subsidised employment; and regular employment (without UBII). Occupational exposure levels are also reported
4 – Results based on a regression analysis using static causal model. Matched controls based on propensity scores.
5- Results are also reported for participants in East Germany, separately for men and women, but not for the total population. population.
6- ATT results also available for or 1, 6, 12, 18, 24-, 30-, 36-, & 42-months post program-start

	Programs started: October 2005 to April 2007. **Mean age** (years): Data not provided **Follow-up:** most outcomes: 1 to 44 months after start of program (latest December 2010) regular employment: 1 to 18 months (latest December 2008) **Missing data** Data from 69 local authorities (zugelassene kommunale Träger) are not included in the sample because the Federal Employment Agency did not administer UBII. Individuals who started multiple programs on the same day, individuals who participated in more than 6 programs, and individuals with missing covariate values were also excluded.	**CT -** A person may participate in multiple training programs, but the total time may not exceed 12 weeks. The objective, educational content and maximum duration of the training is specified by the caseworker. There are 4 main kinds of CT: - *Application training* is intended to give on the job experience while testing if the person is suited to the specific job, *duration ≤ 2 weeks* - *Aptitude testing* is intended to test if the person is suited for a specific occupation or job, duration ≤ *4 weeks* - *Skills training* involves short-term courses to improve the persons computer, language, or occupation-specific skills, duration ≤ *8 weeks* **OJT** – see RN185, the same types of training available in a classroom are also conducted as on-the-job training. **VT** - Training programs that are intended to provide professional and practical skills needed in the job		for all outcomes except stable employment by 6 months. 7- Earnings are adjusted to 2005 values as set in the consumer price index. **Abbreviations** WGM= West German men WGW = West German women EGM = East German men EGW = East German women ALMP = active labour market program UBI = time limited unemployment insurance benefits UBII = means tested unemployment benefits OEJ= One-Euro-Jobs CT= classroom training OJT = on-the-job training VT = vocational training

		market, duration *several months to 1 year* *- Extended training* programs that are expected to result in a vocational degree, duration *up to 3 years.* **Control** **UBII** welfare, social assistance (due to unemployment) Assignment to any ALMP is determined largely by the caseworker, who is guided by a legal and local framework. The objective, educational content and maximum duration of the training is specified by the caseworker. Assignment to OEJ is targeted mainly toward hard to place individuals. Vocational programs are targeted toward those with good labour prospects. Classroom and on-the-job training programs do not focus on either group. Failure or refusal to participate in an assigned ALMP can result in loss of benefits due to sanctions.		ATT = Average treatment effects on the treated

Study (ref) Year Country Study type	Population *(who, where, when)* Target and Comparison groups Age and Sex Follow-up	Study aim Intervention *(Swedish term)*	Outcome/s Results	Risk of bias Adverse events Comments
Dorsett **[11]** **2014** **UK** **RCT**	**Participants** Total: N = 6 754 Program group: N = 3348 Control group: N = 3406 **Age** (years) *Not reported* **Sex:** 95 % female **Follow-up** *Not reported* In-program period 1-3 years Post-program period 4-5 years, 2003 - 2007 **Loss to follow-up** *Not reported*	This study is an exploratory subgroup analysis (NDLP) of the results presented in Hendra, 2011. **Study aim** *To understand "whether the variation across offices in the estimated impacts is statistically significant" (for the NDLP group)* **UK Employment Retention and Advancement (ERA) programme** "ERA aimed at improving the labor market prospects of low-wage workers and long-term unemployed people. Participants in ERA had access to a distinctive set of 'post-employment' job coaching and financial incentives, which were added to the job placement services that unemployed people could normally receive through Jobcentre Plus."	**Outcomes** Based on a multi-level regression analysis <u>Months employed</u> Effects of individual characteristics on program impacts over 5 years: 1 – 3 years: r=0.76** SE=0.39 4 -5 years: r=0.12 SE=0.22 <u>Months on welfare</u> Effects of individual characteristics on program impacts over 5 years: 1 -3 years: r=13.82*** SE=0.30 4 – 5 years: r=10.12*** SE=0.22 <u>Annual earnings</u> (range per 2005 - 2009) Effect of program components for ERA group, r (SE) = range -10 (121) – 309 (144)** * Significance at the 10% level ** Significance at the 5% level *** Significance at the 1% level	**Risk of bias**: Moderate Model controls for: sex, age, ethnicity, partnership status, education level, children (number and ages), work history (1 & 3 year prior), wages in last job 1 year prior, time year of randomization, welfare history (2 years prior), local deprivation

		For details on ERA see Hendra, 2011 NDLP-participants (New Deal for Lone Parents) were assigned a personal adviser (PA) through the public employment service office to provide preemployment job coaching services. PA could also offer job search assistance and address any barriers participants might have had that challenged their search for work. They also had access to an Adviser Discretion Fund that provided money to help participants find employment. on their likely-in-work income at differing hours of work and helped them access education or training. NDLP participation was entirely voluntary. The ERA demonstration project offered services beyond those available under NDLP, mainly in the form of in-work services and financial support. These additional services included in-work advice and guidance plus a series of in-work retention bonuses to encourage		

		sustained employment. Support for training was also available; ERA covered tuition costs and offered financial incentives for those in work to train. It also provided an in-work Emergency Discretion Fund designed to cover small financial emergencies that otherwise could threaten the individual's continued employment. Importantly, ERA services and financial assistance were available for only 33 months. "Office variables: caseload per advisor, proportion of advisers working with ERA participants, proportion of individuals advised to think long term, proportion of individuals helped finding an education or training course, proportion of individuals whose advisers discussed in-work advancement, proportion of individuals given a lot of support while working, proportion of ERA participants aware of the work retention bonus"		
Study (ref)	**Population *(who, where, when)***	**Study aim**	**Outcome/s**	**Risk of bias**

Year Country Study type	Target and Comparison groups Age and Sex Follow-up	Intervention *(Swedish term)*	Results	Adverse events Comments
Galasso [12] **2004** **Argentina** **RCT**[1]	**Participants** N = 848 Target population[1] – people receiving cash benefits from temporary workfare programs in 2 adjacent towns in Argentina (Cutral Co and Plaza Huincul) in October 1998. **Comparison groups** Number of participants / assigned WS: N = 354 / 267 WS + training: N = 213 / 300 C: N = 281 / 281 **Sex:** % female (SD)* WS: 43.7 (49.0) WS + training: 43.7 (49.0) C: 47.0 (50.0) **Mean age:** years (SD) WS: 32.24 (11.92) WS + training: 32.14 (11.15) C: 32.33 (12.12) **Follow-up** 6, 12, and 18 months (December 1998 to May 2000) **Loss to follow-up**[2] 22.5% (191) were lost to follow-up by the 4th wave. 5 people were excluded because they were assigned to control but received treatment.	**Study aim** *To assess the efficacy of providing a wage subsidy and specialized training in assisting the transition from workfare to regular work* **Wage subsidies (WS) with or without training** **Content/description** Background: The authors describe background conditions in detail, including significant changes to workfare program policies during the duration of the study. At that time, the minimum wage in Argentina was 200 ARS / month. WS: a non-transferable voucher for an employer wage subsidy was provided to group members. The voucher was worth 150ARS / month for workers > 45 years old, 100 ARS for workers ≤ 45 years old, and was valid for 18 months. The subsidy was paid directly to the employee; the employer deducted that amount from the wages they paid.	**Employment** Probability of being employed 18 months after t0 by type of job, regression coefficient, MD=mean difference WS +/- training **T C MD** Any 0.478 0.452 0.026 Wage 0.143 0.085 0.057** SEM 0.035 0.021 0.014 PSE - Perm. 0.075 0.057 0.018 - TE 0.106 0.050 0.056** - ALMP 0.296 0.345 -0.049 WS only **T C MD** Any 0.469 0.452 0.017 Wage 0.147 0.085 0.061** SEM 0.037 0.021 0.015 PSE - Perm. 0.076 0.057 0.020 - TE 0.110 0.050 0.060** - ALMP 0.282 0.345 -0.063* Per gender Impact estimates, differences in means, 18 months after t0 Either treatment Men Women Any employment 0.044 0.013 Wage employment 0.034 0.076 Self-employment 0.034 -0.001 Temporary employment -0.028 -0.065 Voucher only Men Women	**Risk of bias** Moderate 1- The population consisted of respondents to the Permanent Household Survey in October 1998 which was conducted in person at the respondents ' homes. Respondents were randomized by lottery into 3 groups. The survey was repeated when the programs started between January

	32 people were excluded because they belonged to a political activist group People who dropped out between baseline and wave 4 were also excluded.	Payment was conditional on the employer formally registering the employee and subsequently paying the associated social security fees which amounted to 30% of gross wages. Participants were informed about the project and how the voucher could be used in one 2-to-3-hour session. WS & training: people were provided with a voucher as above, and a significant training component including a mandatory 3-day labour market orientation workshop and an opportunity to receive vocation skills training[3] (VT). The VT component lasted between 200 and 300 hours, and participants received working materials plus 90% of their normal workfare benefits. Choice of VT was based on personal preference and availability (small business management, industrial welding, home building, professional cooking, pig raising, greenhouse cultivation, and electrician)	Any employment 0.028 0.009 Wage employment 0.042 0.078 Self-employment 0.040 -0.003 Temporary employment -0.060 -0.065 **Income** Income from Labour Mean monthly income (ARS) 18 months after t0 T **C** **MD** **WS +/- training** 120.59 119.27 1.32 **WS only** 123.18 119.27 3.91 Per gender Impact estimates, differences in means, 18 months after t0 Either treatment Men Women Labour income 2.009 2.345 Voucher only Men Women Labour income 3.656 11.18 * Significance at the 10% level ** Significance at the 5% level	and February 1999. Participants from all groups were reinterviewed every 5 to 6 months in 3 more waves: June 1999, December 1999, May 2000. 2- The authors found no evidence of attrition bias in their results 3- The fraction of participants who took advantage of the offered VT is not clearly reported. 4- Analysis as treated **Abbreviations** VT = vocational training T = Treatment C = control

		Control: The control group was not provided with voucher or education.		ARS = Argentinian peso WS = wage subsidies that compensate private sector employers for wages paid SEM = self-employment PSE = private sector employment TE = temporary employment MD = difference of the means ALMP = active labour market programs t0 = start of program, time of first survey in this study.
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**

Graversen [13] 2010 Denmark **Register study**[1]	Participants N = 15 692 Participant selection: Any welfare recipient in a Danish database[1] who entered and exited an ALMP lasting at least 2 weeks between 1994 and 1998, and who was between 18 and 59 years old at time of entry[2] Target group (WS)**:** participants in WS ALMP N = 2 867 Comparison group (non-WS)[3]**:** participants in non-WS ALMP N = 12 825 **Sex:** % female WS: 44 Non-WS: 50 **Age** (% per group) **Years** **WS** **Non-WS** **18–24** 61 53 **25–29** 13 13 **30–39** 16 20 **40–49** 8 11 **50–59** 2 3 Immigrant status (%) Non-Western immigrants : WS: 9 Non-WS: 14 **Follow-up:** Up to 36 months	**Study aim** *To evaluate the employment effects (on employment) of active labour market programmes for Danish welfare benefit recipients, focusing on private sector employment (PSE) programmes.* **Private sector employment programs (WS)** **Content/description** Background: Unemployed people living in Denmark not eligible for UI receive benefits which are means-tested against income and household wealth. These benefits are not subject to time limits but are conditional upon participation in ALMPs. Assignment to an ALMP is largely at the discretion of a case worker. WS: participants in ALMP that pay wage subsidies to private sector employers. Non-WD: participants in public sector job creation schemes (JC), classroom training (CT), and other,	**Employment**[4]***** Employment, 12 months after program exit: Mean effect (SE) using different methods (mean probability) **ATE** [5] 0.20* (0.09) **Per gender** Men Women **ATE**[5] 0.28 (0.10) 0.22 (0.14) *Significance at a 5% level	**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1- Data source: large longitudinal database created by the Danish National Centre for Social Research and Statistics Denmark. It is based on administrative data merged from several registers and contains 10% random sample of the Danish population. The database only provides info for ALMPs that started or ended 1994 to 1998

		which includes a self-employment grant programme that helps welfare benefit recipients start their own business, and any ALMP missing program descriptions in the data). In this study: ALMP are broadly classified into 4 groups: WS, JC, CT and other. Program duration and Consequences of non-compliance are not discussed.		2- The authors excluded participants in public sector employment program in which a wage subsidy was paid to the employer due to issues with data reliability, and people living in a municipality which had fewer than 10 ALMP participants 2 years after they started their program. 3- Because all unemployed people must participate in an ALMP in Denmark, creating a NP control

				group is not feasible. 4- Analysis using a latent variable model allows calculation of standard ATT and ATE as well as DTP. The model accounts for individual characteristics (age, sex, immigrant status, education, family, work experience, and employment and unemployment history) and some characteristics of the municipality they live in (population, regional unemploym

				ent rate, relative use of PSE). It also specifically addresses the link between the outcome and the assignment to participate an intervention. 5- Reference group for ATE: 18 to 24 years old, single, primary or lower secondary school education, 0-2 years' work experience, fraction of time spent employed for 12 months previous, program start in 1993,

				population of municipality 0-19 999 **Abbreviations** ALMP = active labour market programs WS = wage subsidies, private sector employment program JC = job creation strategies, usually in the public sector CT = classroom training UI = unemployment insurance DTE = Distributional treatment effects (probability that an intervention will benefit or hurt a participant) ATT = average treatment effect on the treated (mean treatment effect among those

				who received the intervention) ATE = average treatment effect (mean treatment effect for a randomly selected individual from the population who received the intervention)
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Hamersma [14] **2008** **USA** **Register study**[1]	**Participants** (observations) Eligible: N = 2 323 Almost eligible: N = 1 244 Sample: people over the age of 16 who received welfare in Wisconsin for at least 6 months within any 18-month period between 1998 and 2001[2] **Comparison groups:** Eligible (E) vs. nearly eligible (NE) E: People in the sample who received welfare ≥ 9 months in an 18-month period between July 1999 and June 2001. NE: as above but restricted to those receiving welfare between 6 and 8 months for the same period and do not become eligible or certified for the remainder of the sampling period.	**Study aim** *To examine the effects of these subsidies (WOTC and WTW tax credit) on employment, wages, and job tenure using unique administrative data from Wisconsin* **Employer subsidies** Work Opportunity Tax Credit (WOTC) & WTW tax credit **Content/description** WOTC is a subsidy to employers that hire new workers who are welfare recipients, food stamp recipients between 18 and 24 years old, youth	**Employment, E vs. NE**[3] Employed in 2nd quarter, probability E: Mean SD; NE: Mean SD Before t0: 0.365 (0.482); 0.510 (0.500) After t0: 0.538 (0.499); 0.609 (0.488) DID (SE): 0.059** (0.026) Employed in 4th quarter, probability E: Mean (SD); NE: Mean (SD) Before t0: 0.532 (0.499); 0.619 (0.486) After t0: 0.521 (0.500); 0.584 (0.493) DID (SE): 0.005 (0.025) Employed any time in 2nd year, probability E: Mean (SD); NE: Mean (SD) Before t0: 0.751 (0.432); 0.768 (0.422) After t0: 0.651 (0.477); 0.666 (0.472)	**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1- Data source: rich administrative data from three state-wide databases that provide demographic and welfare history, employment data, and tax subsidy certification.

	Certified (Cert) vs. Qualified but not certified (QNC) Cert: Workers whose employers applied for and received certification of participation. QNC: Welfare recipients from the sample, who found employment with employers who did not apply for or receive subsidies. **Sex:** % female (SD) Eligible: 91.4 (28.1) Almost eligible: 91.9 (27.3) **Mean age**: years (SD) Eligible: 30.23 (8.75) Almost eligible: 31.58 (7.65) **Follow-up** 2 years **Missing data** Some data is lost due to mismatches between databases. Uncertified workers are excluded in counties without any certified workers for comparison	resident in disadvantaged areas, supplemental social security income recipients, and low-income ex-felons. Subsidies are based on the amount of time the person works over 1 year eligibility period: 40% of wages for ≥ 400 hours worked, 25% for 120 to 399 hours worked, and 0% for < 120 hours worked. WTW tax credits are paid to employers who hire long-term welfare recipients (≥ 18 months). Subsidies are only paid if the person works at least 400 hours / year: 35% of wages for the first year, 50% for the second year. Firms must apply for either subsidy at the time of employment. The state employment agency sends certification if the application is approved, which can be used by the firm to claim the subsidies on their federal tax returns.	DID (SE) -0.016 (0.021) * Significance at the 10% level ** Significance at the 5% level *** Significance at the 1% level **Employment, Cert vs. QNC**[4] Quarters employed mean (SD) Subsidised after t0: Cert (N = 840) 3.02 (2.90); QNC (N = 6 239) 3.21 (3.08) CSE[5] (SE) -0.039 (0.145) All jobs: Cert (N = 833); QNC (N = 5 230) 2 years before: 3.9 (2.45); 3.54 (2.43) 2 years after: 5.08 (2.58); 4.80 (2.81) DID[6] (SE) 0.085 (0.147) **Income, Cert vs QNC**[4] Earnings / quarter USD mean (SD) Subsidised after t0: Cert (N = 840) 1,185.40 (1,094.80); QNC (N = 6 239) 1,170.83 (1,283.21) CSE (SE) 105.14** (49.43) All jobs: Cert (N = 833); QNC (N = 5 230) 2 years before: 714.02 (833.14); 585.41 (714.48) 2 years after: 1,533.11 (1,450.68); 1,544.93 (1,620.27) DID[6] (SE) 16.23 (68.10)	2- Because WOTC has a broader uptake, people who were eligible due to food stamp receipt were purged from the nearly eligible control group. 3- Probabilities calculated with a logistic regression. DID after semi-parametric matching using covariates: age sex, education, race, age of children, welfare history, support, and regional

				unemployment rate. Note that Eligible N = 2 323 for DID calculations. SE estimated via 200 bootstrap replications. 4- Probabilities calculated as above, with the addition of covariates for characteristics of the firms: location of headquarters, # WOTC eligible workers employed, labour sector 5- Primary estimate includes all WOTC welfare certifications regardless of apparent

				eligibility but does not include those recorded as having >1 certification (Cert N = 824). Estimates are somewhat sensitive to the group definition. Results for alternative definitions are presented in table 4 6- Primary estimate based on group definition as in point 5. (Cert N = 817) Results for alternative definitions are presented in table 5 **Abbreviations**

				WTW = welfare to work DID = differences in differences (difference in the mean differences before and after) t0 = time that the intervention / participation began, in this study by fiscal quarter CSE = cross sectional estimate
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Harrer **[15]** **2020** **Germany** **Register study**[1]	**Participants**[2] PS WG men : N = 35922 WG women: N = 24472 EG men : N = 13 792 EG women: N = 10 496 IFT WG men: N = 8 598 WG women: N = 4 919 EG men: N = 4 840 EG women: N = 3 824	**Study aims** *1-* To study *whether the new flexible SAI enhance participants' employment prospects* compared to non-participants *2-* To study *whether SAI particularly address the needs of unemployed people with relatively low*	**Employment** Average participation effects on the regular employment probability at 20th month after programme start, compared to ALMP participation in first quarter 2010 (%), estimated percentage points. East Germany, West Germany EG men / EG wo / WG men / WG wo PS 2.8 / 1.4* / 3.4 / 4.2 IFT 19.4 / 20.8 / 16.4 / 17.8 *Statistical significance 5%, all others 1%	**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1- Data source: Department of Statistics of the Federal Employment Agency registry of

Description
Eligible: people between 17 and 61 years old who were registered as unemployed welfare benefit (UBII) recipients in in Germany, in December 2009

SAI group: eligible people who entered a SAI between January and March 2010

Control group[3]: 20% random sample of the eligible population who did not enter any SAI between January and March 2010. They may have been enrolled in other ALMP.

Age groups (%)
PS

years	EG men	EG women	WG men	WG women
17–19	2.8	2.9	3.4	3.8
20–24	15.4	14.0	10.4	9.9
25–29	18.2	15.2	15.1	13.6
30–34	13.2	12.2	14.1	13.9
35–39	10.7	11.1	13.5	13.9
40–44	12.1	13.3	14.5	15.2
45–49	13.1	14.0	13.5	13.7
50–54	9.6	11.2	9.9	10.1
55–61	4.9	6.1	5.7	5.9

IFT

years	EG men	EG women	WG men	WG women
17–19	1.4	1.8	2.9	4.1
20–24	16.7	19.1	11.8	13.1
25–29	25.4	20.2	21.0	18.4
30–34	16.4	12.4	16.0	13.6
35–39	10.1	10.6	13.7	12.4
40–44	10.1	11.6	12.7	13.6
45–49	8.9	11.5	10.8	12.5
50–54	7.4	8.5	7.3	8.5

labour market attachment.

Schemes for activation and integration (SAI), individually tailored welfare to work schemes provided through outsourcing to third parties.

Content/description
SAI may be provided by placement services (PS) or employers (IFT).

PS: schemes that focus on improving skills, reducing individual employment barriers, and finding work for participants. Providers are free to combine elements to suit the individual participant. May include ≤ 4 weeks of practical skills training (IFT, or workshops), duration not limited unless aim is to teach skills for a particular profession where limit is ≤8 weeks (average duration = 2.5 months)

IFT: unpaid internships, aims to accustom participants to regular work schedules and the employment situation at a specific company, and determine the

Income
Real annual income (Euro) by time, PS (Schemes by providers), East Germany, West Germany

< 1 year since last job	EG Men	EG Women	WG Men	WG Women
First year follow up	87	173	459***	366***
Second year follow up	332*	350*	449***	510***
Third year follow up	247	230	340**	423**

1-5 years since last job	EG Men	EG Women	WG Men	WG Women
First year follow up	329***	98	523***	530***
Second year follow up	370***	182	581***	594***
Third year follow up	350**	231	611**	510**

5-< 10 years since last job	EG Men	EG Women	WG Men	WG Women
First year follow up	152*	93	408***	357***
Second year follow up	329***	269*	541***	574***
Third year follow up	309**	1298**	549**	573**

>10 years since last job or never worked	**EG Men**	**EG Women**	**WG Men**	**WG Women**

jobseekers and benefit recipients
2- Divided into subgroups for East and West Germany (for men and women) because unemployment rates and population profiles differed significantly
3- Number of potential controls in the pool exceeded the number in the treated group by 3- to 18-fold (see tables 2 & 3). Because the analysis used a propensity matched control, the

	55–61 3.5 4.2 3.7 3.8 **Follow-up:** 45 months after program start 20 months for comparisons with other programs (ALMP) **Exclusions** Individuals administered solely or jointly by municipalities (not in the federal database) and those who received income from employment or who exited welfare program for any reason between sampling date and hypothetical program start date…	participant's skills and suitability, duration ≤ 4 weeks.	**First year follow up** 39 46 292*** 247*** **Second year follow up** 209* 94 525*** 434*** **Third year follow up** 203 87 538** 426** Real annual income (Euro) by time, IFT (In-Firm Training), West Germany **< 1 year since last job** / **EG Men** / **EG Women** / **WG Men** / **WG Women** **First year follow up** 3406*** 3220*** 3 834*** 2 862*** **Second year follow up** 2547*** 2329*** 2 479*** 1 907*** **Third year follow up** 2063*** 1611*** 2 210*** 1 592*** **1-5 years since last job** / **EG Men** / **EG Women** / **WG Men** / **WG Women** **First year follow up** 4378*** 3265*** 4 669*** 3 403*** **Second year follow up** 3407*** 2564*** 3 542*** 2 842*** **Third year follow up** 3033*** 2401*** 3 264** 2 595** **5-< 10 years** / **EG Men** / **EG Women** / **WG Men** / **WG Women**	4- number of controls is the same as the number of treated. The control pool for IFT excluded individuals in the PS treatment group, and vice versa. Regression analysis using propensity scoring to match participants with similar non-participants. Modelling considered sociodemographic characteristics, last job characteristics, labour market history, partner characteristics, household

			since last job	
			First year follow up	4235*** 3072*** 4 273*** 3 313***
			Second year follow up	3665*** 2749*** 3 560*** 2 570***
			Third year follow up	3488*** 2620*** 3 161** 2 473**

>10 years since last job/ never worked	**EG Men**	**EG Women**	**WG Men**	**WG Women**
First year follow up	3846***	3040***	3 211***	2 426***
Second year follow up	3246***	2494***	3 026***	2 338***
Third year follow up	2968***	2363***	2 920***	2 105***

Statistical significance *5%, **1%, *** 0.1%

income, and labour market indicators based on residence (district)

5- Monetary outcomes adjusted to 2010 using consumer price index

Abbreviations
SAI = schemes for activation and integration
PS = schemes provided by placement services
ALMP = active labour market program
IFT = in firm training
UBI: time limited unemployment insurance benefits
UBII: means tested unemployment benefits conditional on employment seeking activities

<table>
<tr><td></td><td></td><td></td><td></td><td>WG = West Germany
EG = East Germany</td></tr>
<tr><td>Study (ref)
Year
Country
Study type</td><td>Population (who, where, when)

Target and Comparison groups
Age and Sex
Follow-up</td><td>Study aim

Intervention (Swedish term)</td><td>Outcome/s

Results</td><td>Risk of bias
Adverse events
Comments</td></tr>
<tr><td>Harrer
[16]
2021
Germany

Register study</td><td>Participants

Intervention group
One Euro Job-participants entering OEJ during July-October 2012

East Germany
Men N= 16 811
Women N=12 390

West Germany
Men N=16 248
Women N=10 093</td><td>Study aim
To re-evaluate a German job creation programme for unemployed welfare benefit recipients, known as One-Euro-Jobs (OEJs), after a major reform that addressed evaluators' concerns.

Job creation programmes aim at increasing the employability of hard-to-place unemployed, and eventually integrating them into employment. In</td><td>Employment
Treatment effects (ATT) by time since last regular job, 3 years after program start
<table><tr><th>Time since last reg. job</th><th>East, men</th><th>East, women</th><th>West, men</th><th>West, women</th></tr><tr><td>Never been employed</td><td>-0.90</td><td>-1.84 *</td><td>-2.51 *</td><td>1.20</td></tr><tr><td>≤ 1 year</td><td>-3.87 *</td><td>- 5.53 *</td><td>- 4.29***</td><td>- 4.61 **</td></tr><tr><td>< 1-5 years</td><td>-3.87 ***</td><td>-3.77 **</td><td>- 2.09 **</td><td>-1.40</td></tr><tr><td>> 5 years</td><td>-1.59 ***</td><td>-1,52**</td><td>- 0.22</td><td>- 0.34</td></tr></table>Legend: * p<.05; **p<.01; ***p<.001</td><td>Risk of bias:
Moderate

1. Estimating the propensity score was used with a Probit regression of the treatment dummy on a rich set of covariates, including socio demo- graphics, household and partner characteristics, the last regular</td></tr>
</table>

	Control group Persons not entering OEJ during July-October 2012 but could do so later. East Germany Men N=47 711 Women N=40 547 West Germany Men N=96147 Women N=90 620	*2012, the legislator reformed the programme in order to target the hard-to-place more accurately*. **Intervention** Temporary jobs (usually three to twelve months) in part time (usually 20-30 hours per week) and participants receive a compensation of one to two Euros per hour, not deducted from their welfare benefits. Jobseekers who are offered an OEJ but refuse to participate can be sanctioned with benefit cuts; OEJs therefore involve an important compulsory element and can be labelled a "workfare" programme. The reform changed: - stricter targeting very hard-to-place jobseekers.		job's characteristics, regional context indicators, and detailed labour market biography indicators. 2. Data from rich administrative data of the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) which cover the populations of employees liable to social security, registered unemployed, registered jobseekers, benefit recipients, and ALMP programme participants. **Abbreviations** ATT=average treatment effect on the treated SAI=Schemes for activation and integration

Study (ref) Year Country Study type	Population *(who, where, when)* Target and Comparison groups Age and Sex Follow-up	Study aim Intervention *(Swedish term)*	Outcome/s Results	Risk of bias Adverse events Comments
Heinesen [17] **2013** **Denmark** **Register study**[1]	**Participants** Total spells on social assistance: N=66 768 Target group Spells with ALMP participation: N=25 541 (38.3%) Comparison group Spells with no ALMP participation (NP): N=41 227 (61.7%) Description All non-western immigrants receiving social assistance, who were resident in Denmark in 1997 or 1998, and who were between 18 and 66 years old when, between January 1997 and December 2003, they started a spell on social assistance. **Sex:** Spells involving Total spells involving: Men: N=35 553 Women: N=31 215 Participation: Men: N=13 739 Women: N=11 802 (85%) NP: Men: N=21 814 Women: N=19 413 **Age** (% per age group) Women Mean age NP WS JC Other	**Study aim** *To investigate the effect of active labour market programmes (ALMPs) on the duration until regular employment for non-western immigrants in Denmark receiving social assistance (cash benefits).* **ALMP** - Employment with wage subsidy (WS), n= 1 893 - Job creation schemes (JC), n=6 814 - Education, training, or counselling programs (Other), = 16 843 **Content/description** Background Social assistance is provided to unemployed people who do not have unemployment insurance. Benefits are means-tested, and conditional upon employment activation activities, including participation in ALMP.	**Employment** Hazard rate to employment (HR) ALMP beginning <6 months after start of SA spell Women HR SE Men HR SE During WS −0.2394 0.1505 −0.1887 0.0917** JC 0.4131 0.0702*** 0.3791 0.0537*** Other 0.1693 0.0616*** 0.1588 0.0446*** After WS 1.4287 0.1333*** 1.2430 0.0805*** JC 0.6844 0.0920*** 0.3757 0.0718*** Other 0.2369 0.0769*** 0.1240 0.0570** ALMP beginning ≥6 months after start of SA spell Women HR SE Men HR SE During WS 1.3192 0.1786*** 0.8382 0.1100*** JC 1.5442 0.0695*** 1.0925 0.0607*** Other 0.9390 0.0563*** 0.7245 0.0505*** After WS 2.4127 0.1235*** 1.8976 0.0738*** JC 1.2847 0.0871*** 0.4565 0.0861*** Other 0.5277 0.0701*** 0.3266 0.0607*** *** and ** indicate significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively Marginal effects after five years, months on social assistance | | Women | Men |	**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1- Data source: administrative registry of rich data from Statistics Denmark covering all individuals residing in Denmark 2- Selection into the different kinds of programs is not random, and therefore there are significant baseline differences between groups. 3- Analysis uses a timing-of-

16-24	21.3	23.2	25.5	20.5
25-34	39.3	40.4	37.0	42.8
35-44	26.1	27.3	28.3	26.4
45-66†	13.3	9.1	9.2	10.3

Men

Mean age	NP	WS	JC	Other
16-24	19.5	21.6	20.3	15.9
25-34	37.1	38.0	36.7	40.2
35-44	30.3	31.7	32.0	31.9
45-66†	13.1	8.7	11.0	12.0

† reference group means not reported, calculated based on a total of 100%

Follow-up:
Data covers period 1984 to 2004

Interventions:
In the absence of exemptions, i.e., health issues, ALMP should be offered within 12 months of starting a spell on social assistance (actual mean is 15 months). Which ALMP is offered depends on which ALMPs are available in the municipality, the judgement of the caseworker, and characteristics of the individual[2].
Failure to actively seek work may result in financial sanctions. Refusal to participate in an ALMP may result in disqualification for social assistance.

Details about the contents of the specific types of ALMP not reported. Program duration varies mean 5 to 6 months (SD 4 to 6 months)

intervention	Marginal effect	SE	Marginal effect	SE
WS	-9.9	1.3	-15.1	1.0
JC	-3.7	0.5	-4.6	0.6
Other	-1.5	0.2	-2.6	0.4

Time on Welfare
Mean duration of SA spells (in months) over 5-years, compared to NP (Δ)

	Women months	Δ	SE	Men months	Δ	SE
NP	55.0			42.4		
WS	45.1	−9.9	1.3	27.3	−15.1	1.0
JC	51.4	−3.7	0.5	37.8	−4.6	0.6
Other	53.5	−1.5	0.2	39.8	−2.6	0.4

events duration model, which accounts for baseline differences between groups. The analysis only considers participation in the first ALMP in a spell receiving social assistance. Intervention effects are non-parametric. Separate models were used to estimate effects for men and women. Reference parameters are: Years since migration <5 years; from former Yugoslavia;

				refugee; 45 to 66 years old; children 0 to 2 years old; married or cohabiting; no working experience (in Denmark); lives in the metropolitan area of Copenhagen or one of the three largest provincial cities in Denmark; education unknown; 1 to 4 visits to doctors; last period of social assistance began in 1997. Variables are defined at the start of a period receiving social assistance.

				Comments **Abbreviations** SAI = schemes for activation and integration PS = schemes provided by placement services ALMP = active labour market programs NP = non-participants P = participants
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Hohmeyer [18] **2012** **Germany** **Register Study**[1]	**Population** <u>Participants (P)</u> EGM : N = 21 267 EGW: N = 19 111 WGM: N = 20 968 WGW: N = 9 470 <u>Non-participants (NP)</u> EGM: N = 60 513 EGW: N = 51 215 WGM: N = 102 310 WGW: N = 70 990 **Description**	**Study aim** *the impact of one-euro jobs on the employment prospects of different groups of participants was estimated.* **One-Euro-Jobs (OEJ)**, a public job creation program. **Content/description** **OEJ** is an ALMP that subsidises work	**Employment** <u>Regular employment rate</u>[3] Average treatment effect, ATT (%) 12 months EGM EGW WGM WGW -1.1*** -0.4* -0.6** -0.4 20 months EGM EGW WGM WGW -0.3 1.0*** 0.6* 2.7*** * 10% significance level ** 5% significance level *** 1% significance level	**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1- Rich data was assembled from multiple federally administered databases: Employment and

	P: All welfare recipients, aged 15 to 62 years, who were registered as unemployed on 31 January 2005 and who entered OEJ between February and April 2005. NP[2]: 20% of the welfare recipients, aged 15 to 62 years, who were registered as unemployed on 31 January 2005 and who did not start an OEJ between February and April 2005. **Age per group**: (N) P **EGM EGW WGM WGW** **15-24** 5 084 3 339 4 582 2 109 **25-35** 3 527 3 314 5 023 2 137 **36-50** 8 735 8 977 8 836 4 148 **51-62** 3 913 3 474 2 537 1 074 NP **EGM EGW WGM WGW** **15-24** 4 604 3 777 7 716 6 661 **25-35** 15 029 11 927 26 461 18 679 **36-50** 28 710 25 027 47 094 31 306 **51-62** 12 170 10 484 21 039 14 344 **Follow-up** 20 months after program start **Missing data** Data from 69 local authorities (zugelassene kommunale Träger) are not included in the sample because the Federal Employment Agency did not administer UBII in those areas.	opportunities in the public sector that would not otherwise exist. Job placements are expressly temporary (6 month maximum) and usually limited to 30 hours per week, so the participant also has time to search for regular employment (see RN184 for more details). **Background: No OEJ** UBII is a means tested benefit for people who are not available for employment (caring for young children, elderly), or for those judged capable of working at least 3 hours per day, but whose household income from any source (i.e., regular employment, UBI, job training or other ALMP) cannot support a minimum standard of living. (See RN184 for more details)		unemployment history from Integrated Employment Biographies, individual and family demographics from a job seeker database (BewA), household details from UBII receipt history database (LHG, Leistungshistorik Grundsicherung), statistics on the regional labour market conditions from the Federal Employment Agency, and regular employment information from Verbleibsnachweise

				2- Controls stem from a 20% random sample of those who were potentially eligible. If control or treatment group members exited from unemployment between 31 January 2005 and their (assigned or true) programme start, they were dismissed from our sample. 3- Analysis based on one probit model and used propensity score matching (nearest neighbour using 5 neighbours) to control

				for socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, family status, education, migration background; health status; and labour market history, including periods of (un-) employment and previous ALMP participations. Data also presented for subgroups based on age, education levels, and when the participant last held a job. **Abbreviations**

				WTW = welfare to work ALMP = active labour market programs JC = jobs creation scheme ATT = average treatment (intervention) effect on the treated OEJ = One-Euro-Jobs SA = social assistance P = participants NP = non-participants WGM= West German men WGW = West German women EGM = East German men EGW = East German women UBI = time limited unemployment insurance benefits, German UBII = means tested unemployment benefits

				(German social assistance / welfare benefits)
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Huber 19] **2011** **Germany** **Register Study**[1]	**Population** NP: N = 5 210 OEJ: N = 611 Short training: N = 415 Extended training: N = 347 **Description** Participants (NP): Survey respondents who were unemployed, receiving UBII and who started an ALMP between October 2006 and March 2007 Non-participants[2] (NP): Survey respondents who were unemployed and receiving UBII who did not participate in any ALMP between October 2006 and March 2007 **Age** (years) NP: N = 5 210 OEJ: N = 611 Short training: N = 415 Extended training: N = 347 **Sex:** % women NP: N = 59 OEJ: N = 46 Short training: N = 47 VT: N = 49	**Study aim** *Estimation of recent programme effects.* **Hartz IV reform**, German ALMP (WTW) program ALMP included: **One-Euro-Jobs (OEJ)**, a public job creation program **Short skills training** (ST) **Vocational training** (VT): **Content/description** The primary aim of the Hartz IV reform was to (re)integrate welfare claimants into the labour market as quickly as possible, and to reduce welfare dependency. NP: UBII receipt UBII is a means tested benefit for people who are not available for employment (caring for young children, elderly),	**Employment** Regular employment (insured) Programme compared to non-participation, estimated effect percentage, (MD=mean percentage points SE = difference in percentage points) NP P MD SE OEJ 17 22 6 4 ST 22 31 9** 4 VT 22 25 4 4 Minor employment[4] NP P MD SE OEJ 16 13 -4 4 ST 13 12 -1 12 VT 12 12 -1 4 Employment or self-employment NP P MD SE OEJ 37 39 2 5 ST 39 45 6 5 VT 37 36 -1 5 Employment without welfare receipt NP P MD SE OEJ 13 13 1 3 ST 14 22 8** 3	**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1- The authors merged demographic, household and welfare receipt data are taken from a national survey data of welfare recipients with rich administrative data from the several databases administered by the German Federal

	Follow-up Up to 17 months after program start. **Missing data** Data from 69 local authorities (zugelassene kommunale Träger) are not included in the sample because the Federal Employment Agency did not administer UBII in those areas (11 260 observations). Data from people who did not agree to allow their data to be merged between sources (585 observations). Other losses described in Table 2.	or for those judged capable of working at least 3 hours per day, but whose household income from any source (i.e., regular employment, UBI, job training or other ALMP) cannot support a minimum standard of living. UB II amounted to €351 for a single-person household in January 2009. On top of UB II, welfare payments also include rents and housing costs and compulsory social insurance contributions. Further costs for special needs might be covered as well. See RN184 for more details <u>OEJ</u> is an ALMP that subsidises work opportunities in the public sector that would not otherwise exist. It aims to improve participants' employability rather than their direct integration into the labour market. Job placements are expressly temporary (6 month maximum) and usually limited to 30 hours per week, so the participant	VT 13 18 4 4 <u>Welfare receipt</u> NP P MD SE OEJ 79 82 3 7 ST 76 72 -5 6 VT 79 75 -3 7 ***Effect is significant at the 1% **Effect is significant at the 5% *Effect is significant at the 10%	Employment Agency, or regional governments 2- NP does not include people participating in other ALMP not assessed in this study: subsidised employment, start-up grants to enable self-employment and placement services (PS) though private companies 3- Adjusted calliper propensity score matching estimated using probit models for comparison with NP or pairwise. The method

		also has time to search for regular employment, mean duration 7 months in this analysis. ST: short skills training includes general programs lasting between a few days to 2 weeks, maximum 12 weeks. ST aimed to improve general or job search skills. Content may include JSA, application training, aptitude assessment, job willingness assessment, or job interview training. Short educational programs aimed at improving general skills relevant to the job market, i.e., language or computer courses, were also included. Mean duration is 1 month in this analysis. VT: training programs that teach occupation-specific skills focused on adaption to recent developments in the labour market, they may involve classroom education, or in-firm, planned duration vary from 3 months to 3 years. In this analysis VT has a max duration 3 months, mean 2 months.		incorporated socio-demographic characteristics, such as age, family status, education, migration background; health status; and labour market history, including periods of (un-) employment and previous ALMP participations, UBII receipt and program participation records, family demographics, employment histories, as well as regional labour

				market conditions and organizational characteristics of local agencies. Results for subgroups available in table 5, including pairwise comparisons. (Sex, age, children under 3). Data extracted based on survey responses (self-reported). Results based on administrative data is only presented graphically. 4- Monthly salary/wage ≤ €400 **Abbreviations**

				WTW = welfare to work ALMP = active labour market programs JSA = job search assistance SA = social assistance NP = non-participants P = participants VT = vocational training ST = skills training JSA = job search assistance *WF = work first* *LFA = labour force attachment* *Does WF = LFA* *HCD = Human capital development* MD = difference of the means SE = standard error UBI = time limited unemployment insurance benefits, German UBII = means tested

				unemployment benefits (German social assistance / welfare benefits)
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Knoef **[19]** **2016** **Netherlands** **Register study**[1]	**Participants** N= number of women (observations) from 2005 to 2010[2] **Participating municipalities** Target : N= 6 473 (7 502) Control : N= 966 (1 097) **Non-participating municipalities** Target: N= 48 251 (56 053) Control: N= 7 368 (8 162) **Population:** Single mothers who entered welfare in the Netherlands between 2005 to 2010, subdivided into native[2] and immigrant subgroups. **Comparison groups:** Program dimension: Participating ED: 8 municipalities implemented an earnings disregard (ED) ED + JC: 6 municipalities implemented ED and a job creation scheme (JC) Non-participating: 437 municipalities did not opt to implement ED or JC schemes and served as controls	**Study aim** *to investigate policies to increase the labour force participation of single mothers on welfare* **WTW program with 2 components: earnings disregard**, and **job creation** **Content/description** Normal welfare benefits are means tested, all earnings from work deducted 1:1 from benefit payment, conditional on job search efforts. Generous subsidies are available from the government to cover childcare when necessary. A €500 reemployment bonus for returning to work at least 6	**Employment** Inflow rate to part-time job within 2 years of entering welfare, average adjusted predictions (standard error) Immigrants No treatment: 0.046 (0.062) Treatment: 0.234 (0.048) Treatment effect: 0.187** (0.078) Natives No treatment: 0.341 (0.064) Treatment: 0.307 (0.307) Treatment effect: -0.034 (0.064) Finding part-time job, total treatment effect, average adjusted predictions (standard error) Immigrants: 1.778*** (0.640) Natives: -0.130 (0.243) **Income** Total treatment effect, average adjusted predictions (standard error) Earnings Immigrants: 0.095*** (0.027) Natives: -0.062*** (0.022)	**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1- Data from 2005 to 2010 gathered from a rich administrative dataset that contains all welfare recipients in the Netherlands, combined with the national population registry database. 2- Observations = new

	Population dimension: Target: Single mothers with children under 12 Control: Single mothers with children between 12 and 18 Time dimension: During: entering welfare for the first time between 2009 and 2010 Before: entering welfare for the first time between 2005 and 2008 **Sex**: 100% women **Age:** years **Participating municipalities** Target (during): 33.4 Target (before): 32.5 Control (during): 41.7 Control (before): 38.3 **Non-participating municipalities** Target (during): 34.2 Target (before): 32.2 Control (during): 42.9 Control (before): 39.3 **Immigrant status**: % immigrant **Participating municipalities** Target (during): 36.7 Target (before): 34.9 Control (during): 33.3 Control (before): 25.7 **Non-participating municipalities** Target (during): 33.3 Target (before): 31.0 Control (during): 30.3 Control (before): 24.1 **Follow-up:** 2 years	months was implemented in the target municipalities and was in effect in a portion of the non-participant municipalities **ED:** an earnings disregard policy for single mothers with children under 12. Those enrolled could earn up to €4/ hour, max €120 / month that would not be deducted from benefit payments, potentially allowing them to raise their net income by about 13%. Eligible women who were employed before the program started were also eligible for the ED. Implementation began early 2009. **JC:** a job creation scheme for single mothers with children under 12. Municipalities created new jobs, ≥ 12 hours / week, with regular employers through subsidies to employers, or within the municipality itself. Those who obtained a job through the JC scheme were also eligible for the earnings disregard	Income (earnings and welfare benefits) Immigrants: 0.044* (0.025) Natives: 0.027 (0.020)	entries into welfare **Abbreviations** SAI = schemes for activation and integration PS = schemes provided by placement services Δ = change, 1 dimension ΔΔ = change, 2 dimensions ΔΔΔ = change, 3 dimensions ED = earnings disregard JC = job creation

	Loss to follow-up: Data from the municipalities of Amsterdam and Langedijk were excluded. Both participated in the trial, but implementation failed.	Implementation began January 2010 in most municipalities.		
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Kopf **[20]** **2013** **Germany** **Register study**[1]	**Participants** Total P: 61 657 N= CAT: N= 5 355 CAA: N= 12 155 CST: N= 11 603 CCT: N= 12 201 IFA: N= 14 741 IFS: N= 5 602 NP: N= 402 77 Total number of observations = 115 742 Eligible: All registered long-term unemployed, aged 15 to 57, collecting UBII in Germany on 31 January 2005 Target group: All eligible enter a short-term training program between February and April 2005 Comparison group: 20% of all eligible individuals who did not enter a short-term training program between February and April 2005 (NP) **Sex** EGM EGW	**Study aim** *To evaluate short training courses for welfare recipients and to detect which programme type works best with respect to different outcome indicators.* **Short-term training programs** - Classroom application training (CAT) - Classroom aptitude assessment (CAA) - Classroom skills training (CST) - Combination classroom training (CCT) - In-firm aptitude assessment (IFA) - In-firm skills / combination training (IFS)[2] **Content/description**	**Employment**[4] **Training program vs. NP** Stable employment, non-subsidised Percent employed at least 6- or 12-months (propensity score matching) EGM EGW WGM WGW CAT-6 -3*** -1 0 0 CAT-12 -3*** -1 0 0 CAA-6 2*** 4*** 2** -1 CAA-12 2*** 3*** 1* -1 CST-6 2** 3*** 3*** 1 CST-12 1* 2*** 2*** 1 CCT-6 1 3*** 0 0 CCT-12 0 1* 0 0 IFA-6 17*** 24*** 17*** 18*** IFA-12 14*** 19*** 13*** 16*** IFS-6 19*** 22*** 17*** 16*** IFS-12 15*** 17*** 13*** 15*** *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	**Risk of bias** Moderate 1- Data source: Integrated Employment Biographies, which is rich dataset administered by the German Federal Employment Agency 2- In-firm skills training nearly always includes an aptitude testing component

	Total P: 14 37 11 206 N= 2 CAT: N= 835 782 CAA: N= 3 505 2 868 CST: N= 2 554 2 310 CCT: N= 2 545 2 036 IFA: N= 3 943 2 507 IFS: N= 990 703 NP: N= 82 16 69 214 WGM WGW Total P: 23 009 13 070 N= CAT: N= 2 078 1 660 CAA: N= 3 640 2 142 CST: N= 3 823 2 916 CCT: N= 4 668 2 952 IFA: N= 6 048 2 243 IFS: N= 2 752 1 157 NP: N= 145 01 106 38 **Age** EGM Years N= 15-29 7 01 3 30-39 3 36 4 40-57 3 96 4 EGW Years N= 15-29 4 59 2 30-39 2 99 5	Background UBII, are the basic benefits paid to needy, unemployed people of working age and deemed able to work, and who are not / no longer eligible for UBI. UBII benefits are means-tested against household income and assets. Base benefit of €364, as of May 2011. Costs for housing and heating are also covered. UBII receipt is conditional upon employment activation activities, failure to comply may result in financial sanctions. Interventions: 6 short training courses (≤ 12 weeks) Assignment to any ALMP, including short training courses, is largely at the discretion of case managers who are guided by the participants job placement probability, motivation, and family responsibilities[3]. Refusal to participate can result in financial sanctions. ALMP participants continue to receive UBII, with no additional cash		3- Because the responsible case worker uses profiling, the participant characteristics naturally differ significantly between intervention groups 4- Individual employment effects are estimated with a regression model where corrections for differences between groups were applied based on propensity scores using a radius calliper matching method. Characteristics contributing to the propensity

	40-57 3 601 WGM Years N= 15-29 9 859 30-39 6 709 40-57 6 371 WGW Years N= 15-29 5 080 30-39 3 957 40-57 3 991 WGM Years N= 15-29 9 859 30-39 6 709 40-57 6 371 WGW Years N= 15-29 5 080	benefit. The programme costs, travel expenses and additional childcare costs are covered. Interventions are provided by external providers selected through a public tendering strategy that judges strategy and price <u>Application skills (CAT)</u> Includes lectures focused on general knowledge about applying for work, lecture notes, and, optionally, one individual counselling interview or one application situation simulation. Should also test participants willingness to work. Includes up to 16 participants per course Duration *2 days to 2 weeks*, full or part-time. Perfect attendance is required, failure may result in sanctions <u>Aptitude testing (CAA & IFA)</u> Aim to examine the participants abilities to help determine which ALMP are appropriate, or whether they have the skills needed to work in a particular job or occupation. <u>Skills training (CST & IFS)</u>		score include age, health, immigration background, family status, and characteristics of family members, education, employment and unemployment history, and ALMP participation history 5- Work that is not subsidised, **Abbreviations** CAT = classroom application training CAA =classroom aptitude assessment CST = classroom skills training CCT = classroom combined training IFA = in firm aptitude assessment IFS = in-firm skills training (usually combined with

	30-39 3 957 40-57 3 991 **Follow-up** Per month up to 28 months after program start (assessed on first day of each month) **Missing data** "All data and figures in this study exclude the 69 districts in which only local authorities are in charge of administering the UB II, for which such information is not systematically available in the analysed period. According to estimates of the FEA, around 13 per cent of the unemployed are cared for in these districts."	Aim to teach occupation-specific skills. <u>Combination programs (CCT & IFS)</u> Usually, a combination of aptitude testing and skills training. Duration ≤ 12 weeks.		aptitude assessment) ATT = average treatment (intervention) effect on the treated WTW = welfare to work ALMP = active labour market programs NP = non-participants P = participants WGM= West German men WGW = West German women WGM = West German men WGW = West German women UBI = time limited unemployment insurance benefits UBII = means tested unemployment benefits (similar to welfare).
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**

Malmberg - Heimonen [21] **2016 Norway** **RCT**[1]	**Participants** **Target group:** N=360 **Comparison group:** N=257 **Enrolled**: N=617 Normal recipients of social assistance who are enrolled in QP. **Mean age**: 35.5 years **Sex:** 50.9% women **Follow-ups:** 18, 24, and 30 months after baseline. **Loss to follow-up:** Follow-up data missing 18-month: 13.9% 24-month: 13.6% 30-month: 11.7%	**Study aim** *To analyse the long-term effects of an individualised follow-up model on welfare recipients' self-sufficiency*[3] **CMPA.** Implementation of a comprehensive methodological and principle-based approach (CMPA) for administration and follow-up of the normal welfare-to-work program (QP) *(+ Swedish term)* **Content/description** QP is a WTW program that targets the hard to employ population, particularly recipients of social assistance. QP is a conditional, human resource development activation program that provides a generous benefit. QP is a full-time, conditional, human resource development program. Program duration ≤ 2 years. **Target intervention:** QP + CMPA 9/18 participating welfare offices adopted the CMPA model for	**Employment without welfare support** Unadjusted mean values Follow-up: % yes [SD; 95% CI] Target 18-mo: 18.83 [39.16; 14.44 to 23.22] 24-mo: 23.96 [42.75; 19.21 to 28.72] 30-mo: 24.43 [43.04; 19.63 to 29.24] Comparison 18-mo: 12.11 [32.69; 7.79 to 16.42] 24-mo: 16.82 [37.49; 11.84 to 21.80] 30-mo: 14.96 [35.74; 10.35 to 19.56] Significance Follow-up p-value Cohen's *d* 18-mo: 0.037 0.184 24-mo: 0.046 0.176 30-mo: 0.006 0.237 Adjusted correlation with CMPA[4] Follow-up: likelihood (SE) 18-month: 1.66 (0.53) 24-month: 1.51 (0.36) 30-month: 1.77* (0.39) p<0.05	**Risk of bias** Moderate 1- Cluster-randomised by 18 administrating welfare office which chose to participate (out of 50 invited) 2- Data source: baseline data from participant questionnaires, follow-up from a national administrative database from Norwegian Directorate of Labour and Welfare. 3- Self-sufficiency defined as employment without welfare support

		following-up participants. CMPA has 3 main components: building a relationship between counsellor and participant; helping participants develop social networks and coordinate contacts between services; and administrative work. Social workers at offices allocated to implement CMPA were provided with training: 9-day programme of 4 seminars over a 5-month period; and a 3-level supervision structure to support local implementation. **Comparison:** QP as usual (without CMPA) 9/18 participating welfare offices allocated to control did not implement the CMPA follow-up method, and the social workers at these offices did not receive any training.		4- Logistic regression analyses controlled for significant differences at baseline for education level, age, immigrant status, parental status, and previous employment, and clustering effects (model 2, table 4). **Abbreviations** QP = qualification program (Norwegian WTW program) CMPA = comprehensive, methodological, and principle-based approach WTW model

				WTW = welfare-to-work
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Markussen [22] **2016** **Norway** **Register study**[1]	**Participants** **Total QP participants:** N = 19 211 **Target group:** N=8 896 (21 082 observations) **Comparison group:** N=307 003 (1 386 310 observations) **QP Eligibility:** Anyone aged 18 to 55 living in Norway who is assessed as having a substantially reduced work and income capability, and no or very limited social insurance entitlements could choose to participate, based on availablity[2]. **Target group:** QP entrants who were QP eligible before 2008, i.e., before QP implementation began, who earned less than NOK 170 000 over the last calendar year, or on average over the last 3 years, and received some form of temporary income support[3]. **Comparison group:** Social assistance recipients in municipalities who had not yet introduced QP with demographic profiles matching those in the target group, based on propensity scores[4].	**Study aim** *The research question we seek to answer is how participation in the QP affects earnings, employment and benefit trajectories for up to four years after the year of program entry* **QP**, a tailored, voluntary WTW program with human resource focus. **Content/description** <u>Target intervention</u> QP is a full-time individually tailored WTW program that targets the hard to employ population, particularly recipients of social assistance who risk falling out of the system entirely. Participation is voluntary, and anyone meeting the criteria has the right to participate.	**Income**[6, 7] [7]<u>Annual labour earnings:</u> Change in mean NOK / year (SE) Same year: −26330 (16 350) 1st year: −28180 (15 140) 2nd year: 4 250 (20 030) 3rd year: 12 180 (22 760) 4th year: 50 540 * (27 860) *** Significant at the 1 percent level. ** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at the 10 percent level. **Program costs and benefits** Total benefits in terms of extra labor earnings generated by the program do not fully balance the costs of the program during the four-year estimation period covered in the analysis. For the cost-benefit assessment to come out with a positive number, the favourable earnings effects need to some extent to persist after the fourth year.	**Risk of bias**: Moderate 1- Data source: National registers covering the whole Norwegian population. 2- QP was launched in November 2007, rolled out gradually by municipality from 2008 to 2010. 3- This affects selection of new immigrants because they do not

	Mean age: years **Total:** 33.7 **Target:** 32.5 **Comparison:** 61.0 **Sex**: % women **Total:** 44. 0 **Target:** 36.7 **Comparison:** 46.8 **Immigrant status**: % non-native **Total :** 50.7 **Target:** 36.2 **Comparison:** 15.3 **Follow-up:** Up to 4 years[5] Data available from 2000 to 2011 (8 years prior to launch start in 2008 until 4 years after launch) **Loss to follow-up:** The definition of who was eligible was vague, so local municipalities developed their own criteria. The analysis included only about half of the population that entered QP to allow a conservative estimate of potential participants in municipalities that had not yet implemented the scheme.	The main aim of QP is to decrease poverty and marginalisation, by providing a stable and safe economic background to enable a person to transfer into self-sufficiency. The program focus is on finding suitable employment and skill building. Participants develop a plan with a counsellor who then follows their progress closely before, during, and after plan implementation. Participants receive a taxable QP benefit which is more generous than the standard social assistance benefits (about 2x). Wages earned outside of the program are deducted in proportion to the amount of time worked (e.g., 50% employment = 50% reduction). To actively avoid stigmatization, the benefit is paid like a normal taxable income from the municipality rather than the welfare office. Participants have the		receive benefits before arrival. 4- Participation propensity scores are based on 44 variables including age, gender, education level, immigrant status, work and benefit receipt history 3 y. pre-implementation. 5- Follow-up time is related to when the person enrolled in the program, only those enrolling in 2008 could be followed up for 4 years.

		same right to holiday and leave as normal. Program lasts by default 1 year, and is usually limited to 2 years, but extensions can be granted if progress is being made and the counsellor thinks self-sufficiency is imminent. Failure to fully participate can result in removal of the QP benefit, but no other punitive action. <u>Target intervention</u> SA benefits are paid by default to this group of people. SA is means-tested against household income and wealth; benefits correspond to about 15% of average earnings levels in Norway. Eligibility, when not seriously disabled, is based on past contributions to the system, meaning people with little or unstable employment experience often fail to qualify. Time limit is 2-years for unemployment, 4-years for temporary disability) Activation requirements are only applied sporadically.		6- Analysis using 2SLS model that accounts for participation propensity, municipality's time of implementation, and the time of the year plus propensities interacting with base year and outcome year, and with local reform year. Analysis with OLS also available, does not include interaction components from 2SLS. OLS results are significantly different from the 2SLS results.

		Program offers a combination of tailored rehab, training, and job practice and a generous stable and non means tested benefit.		7- Monetary outcomes inflated to 2013 value based on the social insurance system inflator, which approximately corresponds to the consumer price index. To compute dollar amounts, we have used the average exchange rate in 2013 of $1 = NOK 5.88 8- NOK 85 000 is roughly 17% of average annual full-time earnings in Norway 9- All social insurance transfers 10- Includes social assistance

				benefits and some child/housing allowances **Abbreviations** SAI = schemes for activation and integration PS = schemes provided by placement services 2SLS = 2-stage least squares linear regression model OLS = ordinary least squares linear regression model QP = qualification program (Norwegian welfare-to-work program) WTW = welfare-to-work SA = social assistance

Study (ref) Year Country Study type	Population *(who, where, when)* Target and Comparison groups Age and Sex Follow-up	Study aim Intervention *(Swedish term)*	Outcome/s Results	Risk of bias Adverse events Comments
Meckstroth [23] **2019** **USA** **RCT**[1]	**Participants** Number enrolled Total: N= 602 BNF: N = 358 Comparison: N = 244 Number analysed[2] (% women) Total: N= 502 (93%) BNF: N = 309 (95%) Comparison: N = 193 (92%) Hard to employ work-mandatory welfare (TANF) recipients from rural and small towns in Nebraska were enrolled between March 2002 and June 2004. <u>Subgroup very hard to employ</u>[3] Number analysed (% women) Enrolled: N= 211 (94%) BNF: N = 128 (96%) Comparison: N = 83 (93%) **Mean age** (years)[2] Total: 28 BNF: 28 Comparison: 28 **Follow-up** 30 months post RA **Loss to follow-up** 17 people allocated to BNF received no program services.	**Study aim** *To assess whether BNF improved employment, earnings, and personal and family well-being among TANF clients who were referred to the BNF program from Nebraska's small and midsize towns and rural areas.* **Building Nebraska Families (BNF)** **Content/description** **Normal TANF services** TANF has requires participation in work-related activities for at least 30 hrs per week. TANF offers employment seeking and support services. Participation limited to 2-years. Services include: - *Education and training:* including help writing resume, completing job applications, obtaining job leads, and conducting interviews for	**Outcomes assessed:** **Employment** <u>Number of months employed, multivariate regression, effect size, full sample</u> 30-months follow-up: Treatment = 15.0, 0.3 Control =14.8 First year follow-up: Treatment = 4.9, -.05 Control = 5.2 Second year follow-up: Treatment = 6.8, .07 Control = 6.3 <u>Number of months employed, effect size, subgroup 'very hard to employ'</u> 30-months follow-up: Treatment = 12.5, 1.6 Control = 10.9 First year follow-up: Treatment = 4.0, .04 Control = 3.9 Second year follow-up: Treatment = 5.5, .20 Control = 4.5 **Income** <u>Average monthly earnings</u> (dollar), effect size, full sample	**Risk of bias**: Moderate **Comments:** Nebraska. 18 + 30 månader, utbildning + hembesök för familjer m försörjningsstöd obs - två utfall, arbete + inkomst, samma datakälla så samma bedömning 1- Data from Nebraska's administrative data and surveys 2- Reported for the people included in the analysis = those who responded to follow-up survey

	Survey response rate: 18-month: 87% 30-month: 83%	up *to 5 days / week for 3 weeks* *- Job readiness and life skills training*: workshops that covered topics such as health, wellness appearance, interpersonal skills, stress and time management, problem solving, self-esteem, work ethics. Transitional benefits: childcare and medical benefits were available up to 2 years after TANF eligibility ended; financial support to help with transportation or work-related supplies available up to 6-months **BNF program** BNF is an intensive life skills education and home visiting program and designed to complement TANF. Participation was a mandatory after admittance and counted as part of the required job-related activity. Participants also had access to the normal TANF services. BNF was individualized and focused on developing life skills and	30-months follow-up: Treatment =495, -.02 Control =504 First year follow-up: Treatment = 388, -.09 Control = 488 Second year follow-up: Treatment = 559, .05 Control = 527 <u>Average monthly earnings</u> (dollar), effect size, <u>subgroup 'very hard to employ'</u> 30-months follow-up: Treatment =408, .20 Control =324 First year follow-up: Treatment =300, .03 Control = 286 Second year follow-up: Treatment =461, .29 Control = 326	3- Very hard to employ faced multiple serious barriers. 2 of 5 barriers: did not finish high school, health condition, no transportation, no earnings in previous year, receipt of TANF or ADFC for ≥2 years **Abbreviations** TANF = Temporary Assistance for Needy Families SNAP = Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program

		improving personal and family functioning. Life skills education in the home was based on: Survive, Strive, Thrive: Keys to Healthy Family Living. Curriculum included personal improvement, family management, practical life skills such as health, money and nutrition. Educators held a master's degrees in a relevant field and were trained to use the structured lesson plans and collect outcome data. The educators also offered mentoring and informal counselling, as well as service coordination and advocacy support.		
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Mörk [24] **2021** **Sweden** **Register study**	**Participants** Youth employment program N=965 Other municipal employment N=396 Stockholm hosts	**Study aim** The aim of the program is to strengthen the participants' position in the labour market and	**Employment** Estimated effect on number of months with income from work, 13-36 months after program start. **Youth** **Other** **Host**	**Risk of bias: Moderate** The analysis is based on administrative data for

	N=204 **Comparison group** All clients at job centers N=22 012 **Age (mean age in years)** Youth employment: 21.00 Other municipal: 41.52 Stockholm host: 40.25 All clients: 32.96 **Sex** % female Youth employment: 43 Other municipal: 61 Stockholm host: 27 All clients:47 **Follow up** Up to 3 years from start of program.	thereby increase their chances of finding employment or moving on to further education. **Intervention** **Introductory phase** Before being directed to the workplace, most participants take part in an introductory phase consisting of general information about the UI system, unions, norms and rights in the workplace and the program itself. **Stockholm jobs** Taking up a Stockholm job is voluntary and consists of employment in the municipal sector for 6–12 months, where the individual performs (quality-enhancing) tasks that would otherwise not have been performed. There are three different types of the program, in two of which (Youth employment and Other employment), participants work at a regular workplace, whereas in the third (Stockholm hosts), participants are employed at a workplace	Effects 2.76 1.84 -1.80 95 % CI 2.08–3.44 0.62–3.06 -3.0–-0.61 Average 11.8 10.8 9.09 Relative effects 0.23 0.17 -0.20 **Income** Estimated effect on the sum per month, 13–36 months after program start **Youth** **Other** **Host** Effect 1 650 987 -1710 95 % CI 1 026–2 274 -127–2 102 -2 711–-709 Average 7 199 7 619 6 263 Relative effects 0.23 0.13 -0.27	individuals who register at a job centre in Stockholm 2010–2015. To address the fact that treatment assignment is not random and that participants can enter the program at any time after registering at the job centre, we apply the dynamic inverse probability weighting (IPW) approach. We analyse how employment, SA and UI benefit receipt status evolve month by month up to 36 months after program start, as well as the total number of months in, and amounts received from, employment, with SA and UI benefits during two years after the program has ended. We define an

		created especially for this purpose. **Youth employment program** targets individuals aged 16–29 in need of extra support to find and maintain employment. Participants are employed at a regular workplace such as childcare centers, schools, nursing homes or the municipal administration. The employment lasts for six months, but the program may be prolonged for an additional six months if it is deemed beneficial for the individual. **Other municipal employment** is in many aspects similar to the Youth employment program, except for the target group (SA-recipients in general) and the length of the program (typically 12 months). **Stockholm hosts** participants work outdoors, together in teams with other participants and supervisors. Their work tasks include picking litter, clearing snow, and assisting tourists with		individual as employed in month if he/she has positive earnings during that month. We are thus able to examine whether individuals return to SA after their UI benefits expire after 14 months. In addition, we analyse three health outcomes (medical prescriptions for pain relief, psychiatric drugs and hospitalization for any cause) to capture effects on participants' well-being. We combine administrative data from several different sources: the city of Stockholm, Statistics Sweden, the Public Employment Service (PES),

		directions. The employment lasts for 6 (2010–2011)/12 months (2012–2016). The program is targeted at individuals who are 25 years or older with children to care for or other individuals expected to not do well in the open labour market on their own. Taking up a Stockholm job is financially beneficial for participants. The salary received is higher than the stipulated SA level and is not means-tested at the household level. When the Stockholm job ends, participants returning to unemployment are entitled to UI benefits, which will provide individuals with a higher disposable income compared to if they were to receive SA.		the Swedish Unemployment Insurance Board (IAF) and the National Board of Health and Welfare (NBHW). **Abbreviations:** UI unemployment insurance SA social assistance
Study (ref) **Year** **Country** **Study type**	**Population *(who, where, when)*** **Target and Comparison groups** **Age and Sex** **Follow-up**	**Study aim** **Intervention *(Swedish term)***	**Outcome/s** **Results**	**Risk of bias** **Adverse events** **Comments**
Ravn **[25]**	**Participants** Number enrolled (% women)	**Study aim**	**Employment**	**Risk of bias** Low

2019 **Denmark** **Register study[1]**	Treatment municipality (T): N=493 (49.1%) Control municipalities (C): N=3 434 (49.1%) **Target group** 'Activity-ready' social assistance recipients in the municipality of Hjørring in Northern Jutland between 2015 and 2018* Activity-ready = have work hindering issues (e.g., somatic, or mental health condition). No job search requirement. Benefit receipt conditional on participation in ALMP to increase job-readiness. N clients =70 700 Job-ready = judged to have no work-hindering issues, therefore required to actively search for employment to receive benefits. N clients = 40 648. **Comparison-group** Activity-ready recipients of social assistance from municipalities that are part of the same labour market and from the same geographic region. N clients =90 143 **Mean age** in 2014 (years) T: 41.8 C: 42.0 **Other characteristics:** mean number of contacts with GP, healthcare % Single Education Income 2013 Hours of employment 2014 Weeks not receiving benefits Danish, immigrant background *Used for propensity scoring*	*To investigate the effects of the intervention on employment based on the register data.* **Increased intensity and frequency of ALMPs** **Content/description** Increased investment in ALMPs at municipal level. Recruitment of additional caseworkers that reduced caseloads by 50% and increased contact between caseworkers and clients. Addition of ALMPs available to activity-ready which led to an increased proportion of A-R participated in programs for more time.	Number of hours worked the year after receiving social assistance (standard error). Difference-in-difference regression coefficients. Comparison municipalities = 6.65 (13.361) Activity ready = 39.39*** (13.099) Job-ready = 20.24 (23.608)	**main results from the difference-in-differences regressions can be found in Table 2, propensity score matching regression analysis results in tables 4,5,6. **Comments** input=public employment services including reduced number of cases. Combined intervention 1- Data from an administered rich database that merges government registry data from several sources. The database covers all individuals in Denmark

	Follow-up Up to 2 years from trial start, trial not yet finished when this was written **Loss to follow-up** None			from 2010 to 2017. Coming: *This was written before the trial was complete. It was set to end in 2019. Results should be available soon. **Abbreviations** ALMP = active labour market program

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